The Partiality Norm: Systematic Deference in the Office of Legal Counsel by Kim, Adoree
Cornell Law Review
Volume 103
Issue 3 March 2018 Article 5
The Partiality Norm: Systematic Deference in the
Office of Legal Counsel
Adoree Kim
Cornell University, Ph.D. student in Government
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adoree Kim, The Partiality Norm: Systematic Deference in the Office of Legal Counsel, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 757 ()
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol103/iss3/5
NOTE
THE PARTIALITY NORM: SYSTEMATIC DEFERENCE IN
THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
Adoree Kimt
INTRODUCTION ......................................
I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY.......................
A. OLC Written Opinions Dataset ...............
B. Addressing Selection Bias ..................
C. Methodology .............................
II. SYSTEMATIC DEFERENCE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS .....
A. Empirical Analysis ........................
1. Possible Explanation: Response to Crises ...
2. Possible Explanation: Foreign Affairs .......
3. Possible Explanation: Limited Constitutional
Constraints on Presidential Power .........
4. Proposed Explanation: Systematic
D eference.................................
B. Case Studies .................................
1. The 'Torture Memos": OLC as Defense
Attorneys for the President but Independent
Court for the Agencies .................
2. OLC Is the President's Law Firm Even on
Mundane Issues ..........................
III. D IscussIo N .......................................
IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES ...............................
A. Informal Remedies ...........................
B. Structural Modifications ......................
1. Supreme Executive Tribunal ............
2. Director of Adjudication................
3. For-Cause Removal for the OLC ............
CONCLUSION ............................................
APPENDIX 1 - "CRISIS" MEMOS .........................
APPENDIX 2 - PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDA ...................
APPENDIX 3 - AGENCIES ..................................
758
761
761
762
764
765
765
766
768
769
775
775
776
778
780
783
784
787
787
788
788
791
793
795
807
t Columbia University, B.A., East Asian Studies, 2012; University of
Chicago, M.A., Social Sciences (MAPSS), 2014; Cornell University, Ph.D. student
in Government. I would like to thank Professor Jed Stiglitz for encouraging me to
pursue this topic and for his support in the drafting of this piece. I am grateful to
my parents and Eugene Temchenko for their constant support and
757
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
A flurry of action marks contemporary presidential terms,
as Presidents mold domestic and foreign policy through often-
controversial executive orders, proclamations, and other ac-
tions.1 The Obama administration, for instance, suspended
deportation of undocumented individuals who arrived in the
United States as children, 2 and authorized a drone strike on
Anwar al-Awlaki (or, al-Aulaqi), a U.S. citizen and a member of
al-Qaeda. 3 President Trump issued two executive orders sus-
pending travel and immigration from certain countries,4 as well
as an executive order permitting religious organizations to en-
gage in political activities.5 The aforementioned orders affect a
variety of matters, but the legal minds crafting and justifying
the actions came mostly from the same office-the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC). 6
The OLC, located within the Department of Justice, pro-
vides legal advice to the President and to the Executive Branch
agencies. 7 Headed by the Assistant Attorney General and com-
encouragement. I would also like to thank members of the Cornell Law Review for
their thorough work in the editing of this piece.
1 For example, whereas President George Washington issued eight executive
orders, President Barack Obama issued 276 during his term. Executive Orders:
Washington - Trump, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 20, 2017), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php [https://perma.cc/43B6-8Y4S]. This is
not to say that President Obama issued the most orders-Franklin D. Roosevelt
currently holds the record at 3,721 orders. Id.
2 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, White House, Remarks by the
President on Immigration (June 15, 2012, 2:09 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration
[https://perma.cc/N2FF-YYK7].
3 Conor Friedersdorf, How Team Obama Justifies the Killing ofa 16-Year-Old
American, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2012/ 10/how-team-obama-justifles-the-killing-of-a- 16-year-old-ameri
can/264028 [https://perma.cc/5BZ9-P4RH].
4 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec.
Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
5 See Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017). Specifi-
cally, this order instructed the Department of Treasury not to take adverse action
against religious organizations "on the basis that such individual or organization
speaks or has spoken about moral or political issues from a religious perspective."
Id.
6 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a
Citizen, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/
middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?mcubz=O
[https://perma.cc/E38W-H7H3] (discussing the OLC's memorandum that justi-
fied the drone strike on al-Awlaki).
7 Office ofLegal Counsel: About the Office, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, [hereinafter
Office of Legal Counsel] https://www.justice.gov/olc [https://perma.cc/T9D3-
NLSJ]. While this advisory role is delegated to the Attorney General by 28 U.S.C.
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prising around twenty-two lawyers,8 the OLC reviews nearly
"[all executive orders and proclamations proposed to be issued
by the President . .. for form and legality," as well as "various
other matters that require the President's formal approval."9 In
addition to serving as chief counsel on the legality of presiden-
tial actions, the OLC provides advice on complex legal matters
and inter-agency disputes for all executive branch agencies re-
questing it.
The OLC was obscure to the public until the mid-2000s,
when graphic details on the treatment of detainees at Abu
Ghraib as well as an OLC legal opinion that appeared to justify
torture, were leaked to the press.' 0 This memo, along with
other "Torture Memos" released to the public, met widespread
condenation for arguing that the United Nations Convention
against Torture and a U.S. torture statute did not cover the
interrogations of captured al-Qaeda operatives." To some
scholars, the memo's assertion that the President could "sim-
ply ignore the law" was a "stunning proposition, and one that
no worthy legal adviser would advance without due examina-
tion of counterarguments."l 2
Many scholars depict the "Torture Memos" as aberra-
tions-they assert that the OLC operates under "strong cul-
tural norms of apoliticism" and a "long-standing culture of
independence."' 3 They also assert that the "OLC has developed
its own informal procedural norms both to protect its indepen-
dence and to ensure that the Office will pursue . . . a 'court-
centered' or 'independent authority' model of government lawy-
ering instead of the 'opportunistic' model of a private lawyer."' 4
§§ 511-13, the Attorney General delegated these roles to the Assistant Attorney
General who serves as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel. Id.
8 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 9 (2007).
9 Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 7.
10 See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 1448, 1451 (2010) (discussing the leaked "Torture Memorandum");
GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that the OLC goes largely unrecognized by
the public).
11 See Morrison, supra note 10, at 1451; Jonathan Canfield, Note, The Torture
Memos: The Conflict Between a Shift in U.S. Policy Towards a Condemnation of
Human Rights and International Prohibitions Against the Use of Torture, 33 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 1049, 1089-90 (2005) (arguing that the torture definition advanced in
OLC memoranda is impermissibly narrow).
12 Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Chal-
lenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis, 5 J. NAT'L SECURnY L. & Pot'Y 507, 514
(2012).
13 Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch
Legal Policy Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 KAN. L. REV. 579, 584, 594 (2009).
14 Harold HongJu Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 513, 514 (1993) (citing John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion
20181 759
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Such scholars contend that the OLC provides the President
with "detached, apolitical legal advice, as if OLC were an inde-
pendent court inside the executive branch."15 Yet, others point
at specific OLC failures as epitomizing the OLC's "eager[ness] to
please its clients."16
Assertions at both ends of the spectrum base their conclu-
sions on selective case studies and are rarely supported by
more systematic empirical evidence. This Note, therefore, at-
tempts two tasks: first, to resolve the tension between opposing
perceptions, and second, to fill in the methodological gap with
an empirical analysis of OLC-written legal opinions.
In Part I, I present the study's dataset and methodology.
Analyzing 123 OLC memos written over the past three decades,
I determine if OLC memos exhibit deference towards the Presi-
dent, especially in relation to the agencies. This analysis is
followed by two qualitative case studies ruling out alternative
explanations.
Part II presents the empirical findings, and Part III dis-
cusses their implications. I find that the OLC is deeply deferen-
tial to the President and to presidential action, while remaining
relatively impartial towards the agencies. Contrary to expecta-
tions from the literature, this deference is not unique to times
of crisis. It is also not limited to the realm of foreign affairs, or
to constitutional questions. Rather, the OLC demonstrates
systematic partiality toward the President, as illustrated by the
higher rate at which opinions to the President are overruled by
the courts. Such partiality may be rooted in the OLC's ten-
dency to perceive its role differently with regard to the President
than to the agencies, a conclusion the case studies appear to
support. This tendency, I argue, may be inevitable given the
larger structural incentives on the OLC to defer to the
President.
Finally, in Part IV, I evaluate recent proposals to reform the
OLC. These proposals range from informal to structural reme-
dies. I conclude that structural modifications-particularly,
for-cause removal-would conceivably reduce incentives for the
OLC to exercise deference toward the President. Based on this
conclusion, I find that OLC partiality is best addressed by pro-
tecting the officeholders from arbitrary removal.
Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prole-
gomenon, 15 CARozo L. REV. 375, 382-400 (1993)).
15 GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 33.
16 Koh, supra note 14, at 515.
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I
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Analyzing OLC written opinions published on the OLC
website, this study applies a two-part methodology of statistical
analysis and qualitative case study to test the hypothesis that
the OLC exercises systematic deference to the President in its
written legal advice. This Part introduces the dataset, evalu-
ates the representativeness of the data, describes possible
sources of bias, and explains the methodology.
A. OLC Written Opinions Dataset
I compiled a dataset of 202 written OLC legal opinions, or
memoranda, addressed to the Counsel of the President and the
general counsels of the executive agencies. These memos are
available freely on the OLC website.' 7 Of these, 123 memos,
written in the years between 1987 and 2017, are addressed to
the Counsel of the President or the Attorney General.' 8 These
opinions include responses to requests by the President's
Counsel and the Attorney General to the OLC to review the
legality of a proposed executive initiative, the scope of a partic-
ular statute or clause in the Constitution, the potential conse-
quences of a particular executive action, or the legality of
pending legislation.' 9 All executive orders and proclamations
must pass through the OLC "for form and legality." 2 0
In addition, I have collected a set of 79 opinions, written
from 2007-2017, addressed to the general counsels of various
executive agencies and departments. The opinions involve
17 Opinions, U.S. DEP'T JUST., OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, https://
www.Justice.gov/olc/opinions-main [https://perma.cc/9E9E-P9H2].
18 A few of the memos are formally addressed to the Attorney General; they
are included in this sample because it was clear that the Attorney General would
be giving this advice to the President or the President's Counsel. Not all memos
for the Attorney General are considered written for the President. Some memos
were written by the OLC for the Attorney General as advice regarding some legal
matter that appeared to be of personal concern for the Attorney General and was
unrelated to any presidential request for advice.
19 Opinions, supra note 17. See App. 2 for a list of memos written to the
President.
20 Office ofLegal Counsel, supra note 7. In rare circumstances, the President
may rely on agencies' general counsel. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 10, at 1451
(stating that counsel for the President and various departments often handle day-
to-day matters for their clients); Carrie Johnson, Key Justice Dept. Office Won't
Say If It Approved White House Executive Orders, NPR (Jan. 27, 2017, 12:03 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2017/01/27/511998206/key-justice-dept-office-won-t-
say-if-it-approved-white-house-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/Z2Q7-RYSU
(noting that the President sometimes bypasses the OLC).
2018]1 761
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mostly complex legal questions concerning inter-agency dis-
putes, and agency adjudication and rulemaking. 2 1
B. Addressing Selection Bias
A large number of written opinions remain undisclosed to
the public. 22 While it is impossible to know the actual number
of opinions written so far, judging from the list of total OLC
memos from 1998-2013 published on the OLC website, the
number of published OLC memos in that time frame amount to
about one-half the total number written. Unfortunately, the
large number of undisclosed memos prevents us from drawing
firm conclusions using the sample of disclosed memos. How-
ever, we may make some inferences as to the representative-
ness of the sample, using the following facts and assumptions.
First, the sample of disclosed memos conceivably over-rep-
resents legal opinions on substantive questions of a non-sensi-
tive nature, for both memos to the President and memos to the
agencies.2 3 Although the sample includes all opinions dis-
closed through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests-
such opinions tend to be more sensitive-highly classified
memos regarding ongoing national security or foreign policy-
related initiatives are unlikely to be disclosed under FOIA, 24
except on the rare occasion that information on classified ini-
tiatives is first leaked to the press, generating sufficient pres-
sure on the administration to force disclosure. 25 The sample is
21 See App. 3 for a list of memos written to the agencies.
22 See McGinnis, supra note 14, at 428 (noting that OLC only publishes its
opinions years after producing them); Morrison, supra note 10, at 1476-77 (not-
ing that OLC frequently chooses not to publish its opinions at all).
23 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Att'ys of the Office of Legal Counsel 4 (May 16,
2005), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/best-practices.pdf Ihttps://perma.cc
/V56W-AHME] (the OLC must "give[ ] due weight to the publication recommenda-
tions of interested agencies and components, particularly where they raise spe-
cific concerns about programmatic or litigation interests," which amounts to a
power to veto disclosure); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Att'ys of the Office of Legal Counsel 5-6 (July
16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ffiles/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/
olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf [https://perrna.cc/7HZH-UY5A] (noting that the
OLC will refrain from publishing a memorandum "when doing so is necessary to
preserve internal Executive Branch deliberative processes or protect the confiden-
tiality of information covered by the attorney-client relationship between OLC and
other executive offices").
24 Memorandum from Barron, supra note 23, at 5 (explaining that the OLC
will "decline to publish an opinion when disclosure would reveal classified or
other sensitive information relating to national security").
25 As was the case for the "Torture Memos." See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay
S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), [hereinafter Bybee, §§ 2340-2340A]
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also likely to under-represent memos supporting covert execu-
tive actions deemed unsuccessful, except for actions that were
later exposed by Congress or the media.2 6
How does this bias affect the empirical results? As the
literature suggests,2 7 and as the data supports, the OLC is
more inclined to defer to the President and the agencies on
matters pertaining to foreign affairs than domestic affairs.
Matters pertaining to national security and foreign policy are
also more likely to remain undisclosed. Despite only 25% of
memos to the President in my sample reflecting foreign issues,
the actual number of such memos is presumably much
higher.28 If so, my empirical results are likely to underestimate
the deference the OLC routinely gives to the President and the
agencies. This does not detract from my overall argument.
There may be some concern of selection bias in the types of
requests submitted to the OLC by the President versus the
agencies. In general, "All executive orders and proclamations
proposed to be issued by the President are reviewed by the
Office of Legal Counsel for form and legality, as are various
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UBC2-5JAV] (discussing OLC's opinion regarding the legality of tor-
ture). Similarly, the Obama administration, despite promising that "the Office will
not withhold an opinion merely to avoid embarrassment to the Office or to individ-
ual officials, to hide possible errors in legal reasoning, or 'because of speculative
or abstract fears,'" refused to disclose the OLC written opinion supporting a drone
strike on U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki. See Memorandum from Barron, supra
note 23, at 6. A federal court eventually ruled in favor of a freedom-of-information
lawsuit filed by the New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union re-
questing disclosure. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 806 F.3d 682,
690-91 (2d Cir. 2015). Additionally, consider the administration's controversial
exercise of executive privilege to protect Justice Department documents on Oper-
ation Fast and Furious. See Operation Fast and Furious Fast Facts, CNN (Sept.
18, 2017, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/americas/opera
tion-fast-and-furious-fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/UBN9-RPS8]; Ian Tuttle, El
Chapo's Capture Puts 'Operation Fast and Furious' Back in the Headlines, NAT'L
REVIEW (Jan. 21, 2016, 7:08 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/
430153/fast-furious-obama-first-scandal [https://perma.cc/4JM3-NJZWI; Kelly
Riddell, Obama Administration Restricts Investigative Powers of Inspectors Gen-
eral. WASH. TIM5s (July 23, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2015/jul/23/obama-restricts-investigative-powers-inspectors-ge/ [https://
perma.cc/MUT8-2VRY]. Attempts to withhold key documents from congressional
subpoena were likewise overruled in Connittee on Oversight and Government
Reform, United States House of Representatives v. Lynch. See Comm. on Over-
sight & Gov't Reform, U.S. H.R. v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 120-21 (D.D.C.
2016).
26 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27 See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 8 (suggesting that the OLC is under
much greater pressure to defer to the President on decisions regarding security
matters).
28 See Morrison, supra note 10, at 1478.
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other matters that require the President's formal approval." 29
The President will not seek a written legal opinion from the
OLC, relying on oral advice or email, unless the matter is of
such legal complexity as to merit a thoroughly researched writ-
ten analysis.3 0 For more menial, mundane matters, the Presi-
dent is likely to rely on White House legal counsel.3 1 Agencies,
on the other hand, will generally request written advice from
the OLC on two occasions: (1) an inter-agency dispute requir-
ing third-party adjudication; (2) the agency's legal counsel is
unsure about a complex legal question.32 The agency "might
want to proceed with an initiative that is subject to some legal
doubt, and must decide whether to solicit an OLC opinion on
the issue."33 Thus, both the President and the agencies are
likely to approach the OLC with complex legal questions on
which the President's counsel and the general counsels of the
agencies need additional legal advice.
C. Methodology
The empirical analysis has two parts. First, I collect basic
descriptive statistics using the dataset of OLC opinions. Spe-
cifically, I calculate the percentage of presidential and agency
memos that expand, rather than limit, executive action, finding
that OLC memos expand presidential action at higher rates
than they do agency action. I then proceed to dismiss three
hypotheses that may explain this variation-namely, that the
OLC defers due to: (1) pressures of national crises; (2) the Presi-
dent's power over foreign affairs; or (3) the flexibility of consti-
tutional powers of the President versus the statutory powers of
agencies.
Ruling out these explanations, I propose that the OLC ex-
ercises intentional deference when writing opinions for the
President. I supplement this hypothesis by examining the rate
at which courts later litigated and overruled OLC opinion-
backed presidential and agency actions. The greater frequency
with which the courts overruled presidential actions supports
the theory that the OLC's legal advice may consistently over-
expand presidential powers relative to agency powers.
29 Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 7.
30 See Morrison, supra note 10, at 1461-62.
31 See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CAR-
DOZO L. REv. 437, 488 (1993).
32 See Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 7.
33 Lund, supra note 31, at 493.
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Three case studies supplement these findings. The first
study compares the texts of two 2002 memos on the interroga-
tion of al-Qaeda detainees, addressed to the President and to
the agencies. Although both memos approve the course of ac-
tion, how the OLC justifies the actions suggests that the OLC
perceives its role as a legal adviser to the President and the
agencies differently. In particular, the OLC acts as a somewhat
impartial adjudicator for the agencies but as a quasi-defense
counsel for the President. The second and third case studies
examine two memos to the President from 1984 and 1997 on
the applicability of a political contribution limitation to execu-
tive branch officials, and the removal of an executive official,
respectively. Both memos support the conclusion that the OLC
tends to behave as the President's defense counsel rather than
as an objective legal advisor.
II
SYSTEMATIC DEFERENCE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
A. Empirical Analysis
Over the past three decades, an overwhelming 92% of OLC
written legal opinions to the President supported the expansion
of presidential action (see Figure 1). When compared to the
proportion of memos written for the agencies, this percentage
appears particularly extreme: 57% of memos addressed to the
agencies limited action over the past decade (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 1. OLC MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT, 1987-2017
O Expanding Action (E)
0 Limiting Action (L)
92%
7652018]1
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FIGURE 2. OLC MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE AGENCIES,
2007-2017
Memos to the President Memos to the Agencies
43%
57%
90%
O Expanding
0 Limiting
These figures raise the question of what causes the dis-
crepancy. I analyze three possible explanations. First, the
OLC adheres to norms of impartiality except in times of na-
tional crisis, when pressure to give the President full leeway to
exercise executive powers reaches a peak. Although crisis
might explain the high overall proportion of "expansive"
memos, it does not account for the discrepancy between
memos addressed to the President and those addressed to the
agencies. Second, if the OLC tends to defer more on foreign
affairs than on domestic affairs, then the greater proportion of
presidential memos dealing with foreign affairs may be creating
the appearance of a higher rate of deference to the President.
Third, presidential actions may be less subject to statutory and
constitutional constraints than agency actions, allowing the
OLC greater leeway to approve the former.
In this section, I critique these explanations by analyzing
the dataset with statistical calculations. I then propose a
fourth, more plausible explanation for the pattern of discrep-
ancy, arguing that the OLC is systematically and intentionally
deferential to the President.
1. Possible Explanation: Response to Crises
Scholarship on OLC independence seems to suggest that
the OLC-impartial and apolitical at most times-yields to po-
litical pressures in only the most exceptional of circum-
stances.34 After all, the most controversial and extreme
expansions of presidential power occur in the context of na-
tional crisis and war-often with the support of the Attorney
34 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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General and/or the OLC.3 5 Scholars focusing on OLC
politicization emphasize the post-9/11 OLC memos dealing
with terrorists and surveillance as evidence of the OLC's role as
the President's rubber stamp.3 6
The OLC's deference for the presidential agenda may be
especially pronounced in matters pertaining to national secur-
ity, humanitarian disasters, and war. Former OLC head Jack
Goldsmith has described the immense pressure felt by White
House officials in dealing with the barrage of emerging terrorist
threats in the aftermath of 9/11. Such pressure may have
convinced OLC deputy head John Yoo that giving the President
maximum authority to deal with captured terrorists was neces-
sary for the safety of Americans.37
However, the data shows that the proportion of OLC
memos supporting presidential action remains excessively high
even after excluding all memos written for the President on the
legality of executive action on issues of national security, for-
eign and humanitarian intervention, and war. Since 1987,
there have been thirty such OLC opinions.38 These memos
range from an opinion on sending military forces to Somalia in
1992, to an opinion regarding the use of military force in Libya
in 2011.
Of the ninety-three memos unrelated to crisis, only nine
limit presidential action. After excluding the "crisis" memos,
the rate at which the OLC supports presidential action remains
as high as 90.3%, suggesting that deference to the President is
not simply an outcome of pressurized politics in times of crisis.
Although the OLC may issue a higher rate of approvals in such
situations-indeed, all thirty "crisis" memos expand presiden-
tial authority-deference appears to be the norm, not the
exception.
35 See Arthur H. Garrison, The Opinions by the Attorney General and the
Office of Legal Counsel: How and Why They Are Significant, 76 ALB. L. REv. 217,
220 (2012); Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the
Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REv. 409, 410 (2011).
36 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance?: Reconciling
Crisis and Constraint at the Office of Legal Counsel, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 809, 811
(2012) ("In authorizing coercive interrogation techniques and a broad program of
warrantless surveillance ... [OLCI lawyers allowed the President to operate with
minimal accountability. . . .").
37 GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 11, 168-69.
38 See App. 1.
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2. Possible Explanation: Foreign Affairs
An alternative explanation for the higher percentage of "ex-
pansive" memos written to the President than to the agencies is
that a greater proportion of presidential memos pertain to for-
eign affairs.
The OLC is more likely to defer to the President and the
agencies on matters related to foreign affairs than domestic
affairs. The Supreme Court has "recognized the President's
'vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign rela-
tions.'"3 9 The President, in fact, has "a degree of independent
authority to act" in matters of foreign affairs. 40 This is because
"[t]he President ... possesses in his own right certain powers
conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief
and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs."4 1 On the other
hand, the President's domestic powers are relatively weaker.42
Indeed, for both the President and the agencies, the OLC
deferred at a higher rate in opinions related to foreign affairs
than it deferred in opinions related to domestic affairs (see
Table 1). Moreover, memos pertaining to foreign affairs com-
prise 30% of presidential memos and only 13% of agency
memos in the dataset. If the OLC allows greater deference on
foreign affairs, then memos to the President would show a
higher overall rate of deference. However, even if I exclude all
memos dealing with foreign affairs, the OLC approves 90% of
the President's domestic actions, compared to 60% of the agen-
cies' domestic actions. Additionally, if I limit the analysis to
memos pertaining to foreign matters, the OLC approves 97% of
the President's foreign actions, compared to 70% of agencies'
foreign actions. Thus, the higher rate of deference toward the
President must be explained by reasons other than the foreign-
domestic distinction.
39 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)).
40 Id.
41 Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948).
42 For example, the President does not have the power to enter into executive
trade agreements affecting domestic commerce. United States v. Guy W. Capps,
Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953), affd, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) ("We think,
however, that the executive agreement was void because it was not authorized by
Congress and contravened provisions of a statute dealing with the very matter to
which it related and that the contract relied on, which was based on the executive
agreement, was unenforceable in the courts of the United States for like reason.").
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TABLE 1. DEFERENCE FOR OLC MEMOS ON FOREIGN VS.
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
Party Number of
Addressed by Number of Memos that 'Deference
Memo Type of Issue Memos are Expansive Rate'
President Foreign 37 36 97%
Domestic 86 77 90%
Agencies Foreign 10 7 70%
1 1 Domestic 69 40 60%
3. Possible Explanation: Limited Constitutional
Constraints on Presidential Power
A third explanation is that memos to the President fre-
quently involve the analysis of constitutional rather than statu-
tory questions. Because the Constitution allows greater
flexibility in interpretation than many statutes covering execu-
tive and agency actions, the OLC may have broader leeway to
interpret the scope of presidential powers than to interpret
agency powers.
The Constitution appears to vest great power in the Presi-
dent: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."4 3 Nonetheless, the powers of the
President are limited; the President has no inherent power to
act in the public interest that could be implied from the enu-
merated powers.4 For example, the President's decision to
make war could not be challenged, so long as Congress author-
ized the making of war (or at least did not expressly disapprove
of it). 4 5 On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a President's decision to wiretap phones was a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and that the President and his
staff were not entitled to immunity, because they did not act in
reliance on any statute.4 6 Moreover, while the President has
43 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
44 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)) ("The President's authority to act,
as with the exercise of any governmental power, 'must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.'").
45 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1154 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that
"there has been participation by Congress sufficient to authorize and ratify Ameri-
can military activity in Vietnam," but remarking that the war making could be
challenged if "the President's conduct has so altered the course of hostilities in
Vietnam as to make the war as it is currently pursued different from the war
which we held in Orlando and DaCosta to have been constitutionally ratified and
authorized by the Congress, or that Congressional ratification and authorization
has terminated").
46 Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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broader discretion when he or she acts in response to an emer-
gency, any order the President issues expires once that emer-
gency situation terminates. 4 7
Contrary to presidential power, an administrative agency
derives its power wholly from the statute that creates it: "[AIn
agency has all the implied authority reasonably necessary to
accomplish a delegated purpose."4 8 Agencies are thus only al-
lowed to make rules that are necessary, reasonably adapted to
the purpose for which they are promulgated, and not arbi-
trary.49 With regards to how the agency will adjudicate or en-
force those regulations, however, administrative agencies are
generally free to devise their own procedure.5 0 For an agency
rule or regulation to be valid, it must satisfy a number of re-
quirements. First, rulemaking must be within the authority
delegated to the agency.5 1 Second, the administrative rule
must be appropriate and necessary. 52 Third, the rule must be
uniform and equal in effect;5 3 in other words, it must not dis-
criminate.5 4 The general principle is that rules and regulations
made by agencies must have a rational basis.5 5
Perhaps the greater deference to the President can be ex-
plained by the greater flexibility of the Constitution; indeed, the
data reveals that a higher percentage of memos to the Presi-
dent, as opposed to the agencies, involve constitutional inter-
47 Bauer v. United States, 244 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1957).
48 Eldercare Props., Inc. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 63 S.W.3d 551, 558 (Tex.
App. 2001), abrogated by Tex. Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs. v. Mega
Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 230-31 (1974) (allowing an agency to create reasonable classifications to give
effect to congressional appropriation).
49 See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (W.D. Okla.
1977) ("Administrative regulations must be consistent with the statute's purposes
and reasonably adapted to carry out those purposes."); Commonwealth v. Diaz,
95 N.E.2d 666, 668-69 (Mass. 1950) (holding that Congress may delegate power
to boards and officers to enact details of an adopted policy, and that this delegated
power "must not be exercised arbitrarily"); Green River Cmty. Coll., Dist. No. 10 v.
Higher Ed. Personnel Bd., 622 P.2d 826, 829 (Wash. 1980) ("[Administrative rules
adopted pursuant to a legislative grant of authority . . . should be upheld on
judicial review if they are reasonably consistent with the statute being imple-
mented."), modtifed on other grounds on reh'g, 633 P.2d 1324 (1981).
50 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978).
51 See Green River, 622 P.2d at 829 (holding that agencies only have powers
"either expressly granted or necessarily implied from statutory grants of
authority").
52 See N.Y. Foreign Freight Forwarders & Brokers Ass'n v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n,
337 F.2d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 1964).
53 Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 44 C.C.P.A. 83, 85 (1957).
54 See Epley v. Comm'r, 183 F.2d 1020, 1022 (5th Cir. 1950).
55 Coakley v. Postmaster of Bos., 374 F.2d 209, 210 (1st Cir. 1967).
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pretation (see Figure 3). However, if I limit the sample to
memos that perform constitutional interpretation, the differ-
ence in the probability of the OLC supporting the action re-
mains: while 71% of memos to the agencies expand agency
action, 94% of memos to the President expand presidential
action. On the other hand, even when dealing with purely stat-
utory matters (see Figure 4), the OLC still expresses far greater
deference toward the President than it does toward the agen-
cies. While 56% of "strictly statutory" memos expand powers
for the agencies, 84% of such memos expand powers for the
President.5 6
FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF EXPANSIVE VS. LIMITING MEMOS USING
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Memos to Agencies Memos to President
29%
71%
FIGURE 4. PERCENTAG
O Expansive
0 Limiting
E OF EXPANSIVE VS. L
STATUTORY ANALYSIS
6%
94%
IMITING MEMOS USING
Memos to Agencies Memos to President
84%
O Expansive
0 Limiting
56 Note that memos involving constitutional analysis are more likely to ex-
pand powers, both for the President and for agencies, than are memos confined to
statutory analysis.
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Therefore, I tentatively conclude that OLC memos are def-
erential toward the President for reasons other than the inter-
pretive flexibility afforded by the Constitution as opposed to
statutes.
4. Proposed Explanation: Systematic Deference
I have so far shown how the first three possible explana-
tions lack empirical support. The fourth, and most convincing,
explanation for why OLC memos addressed to the President
expand power at higher rates than those addressed to the
agencies is that the OLC gives systematic deference to the
President.
In examining both the higher percentage of OLC memos
supporting presidential action and the higher percentage that
were later overruled by the courts, there emerges a trend of
bias in OLC memos toward allowing questionable over-exten-
sions of presidential powers.
Of the 113 OLC memos supporting presidential action over
the past three decades, nearly a quarter of memos supported
actions that were challenged and litigated in the courts. Of the
litigated actions, half were eventually overruled (see Table 2).57
TABLE 2. "ExPANSIVE" MEMOS TO PRESIDENT LITIGATED IN COURT,
1987-2017
Percentage
Memos Litigated in Court (out of litigated actions)
Upheld 42%
Overruled 50%
Unreviewable (moot,
nonjusticiable, lacks standing)
57 See, e.g., Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. H.R. v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53,
106-08 (D.D.C. 2008) (disagreeing that the President can assert executive privi-
lege); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1336-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(disagreeing that the President can issue an executive order on government pro-
curement). Other memos were overruled in dicta. For example, the OLC advised
the President that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to captured Taliban
combatants. The Supreme Court, however, found that the Geneva Conventions
did protect detainees whether or not they qualified as prisoners of war, and that
Taliban combatants were entitled to seek habeas corpus to determine their POW
status. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796-98 (2008); Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633-35 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-85 (2004).
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TABLE 3. "EXPANsivE" MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT, 1987-2017
Percentage
Memos Litigated in Court (out of total number of memos)
Upheld in Court 10%
Overruled in Court 12%
Such "overruled" memos account for 12% of all OLC
memos supporting presidential action over the past thirty
years (see Table 3). Taking the courts' rulings as the final word
on the action's legality, at least 12% of OLC opinions in support
of more expansive presidential powers appear to over-expand
presidential powers beyond the bounds of what is permissible
by law. Although 12% may not seem particularly egregious,
many of the memos are unlikely to be litigated because they do
not cause injury.58 Other OLC-backed presidential actions
have not been litigated due to shifting political circumstances 5 9
or have been ruled unreviewable,6 o yet were ceased and
58 Some memos, for example, authorize action that would not create
cognizable injury. See, e.g., Whether Bills May Be Presented by Cong. and
Returned by the President by Elec. Means, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1-2 (2011)
(authorizing President Obama to sign bills electronically); Whether the President
May Sign a Bill by Directing that His Signature Be Affixed to It, 29 Op. O.L.C. 97,
97 (2005) (elaborating on previous advice that the President may constitutionally
sign a bill using an autopen). The Supreme Court has consistently required a
cognizable, personalized, and concrete injury to establish Article III standing.
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (holding that
citizens lack standing to sue when a federal agency's policies fail to prevent school
segregation). Others deal with appropriations law, supervision of which is vested
in the Comptroller General. See 31 U.S.C. § 3526(a) (2012); Reimbursement of
Expenses Under 5 U.S.C. § 5503(a), 22 Op. O.L.C. 29, 29 (1998). See also About
GAO, U.S. GOVT AccouNTABILnY OFFICE, https://www.gao.gov/about/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PYN8-UW9B] (stating that the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), headed by the Comptroller General, "advise[s]
Congress and the heads of executive agencies about ways to make government
more efficient, effective, ethical, equitable and responsive"). Accordingly, OLC's
legal accuracy would arguably be better measured in reference to the memos
litigated, rather than those without subsequent history.
59 For example, former Assistant Attorney General, Randolph D. Moss,
composed a memo on whether a former president can be indicted and prosecuted
for offenses previously addressed by the House and Senate. See Whether a
Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same Offenses for Which He
Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op. O.L.C. 110,
110-11 (2000). However, charges of indictment against former President William
J. Clinton were dropped when the Independent Counsel entered into a bargain
with the President where Clinton accepted non-criminal sanctions, such as
penalty from the Arkansas Bar.
60 See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2011)
(advising that the President has the constitutional authority to use military force
in Libya). A challenge to the President's power to use force in Libya was later held
to be moot. Whitney v. Obama, 845 F. Supp. 2d 136, 139-40 (D.D.C. 2012).
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condemned by the OLC in subsequent administrations, 6 1
criticized by judges and academics, 62 and/or overruled by
subsequent congressional statutes.6 3
Table 4 shows a comparison of OLC memos supporting
presidential versus agency actions that were litigated in court.
Twenty-one percent of agency actions backed by OLC opinions
were litigated. Of these, only 20% (of such litigated agency
actions) were overruled-much lower than the percentage of
litigated presidential actions overruled by the courts.
61 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, Assistant Att'y Gen., to
John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. 2-5 (May 6, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/pages/attachments/2014/09/19/may_6_2004_goldsmith opinion.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B58K-UKSP] (concluding that the President has legal
authority to authorize the NSA to conduct certain signals-intelligence activities
and that the STELLAR WIND program is constitutional). The program was ceased
and condemned by the Justice Department in 2009. See Eric Lichtblau & James
Risen, Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 16, 2009, at Al.
Also, the OLC memo on standards of conduct for interrogation was later
condemned by the Justice Department as "poor judgment." Memorandum from
David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Eric Holder, Att'y Gen. 68 (Jan. 5,
2010), https://www.aclu.org/ffiles/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20100105_DAG_
MargolisMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y49D-CKVY].
62 See, e.g., Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Clemency
Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (1999) (advising that the President may assert
executive privilege over documents and testimony related to decisions to offer
clemency). See also Mters, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 104 ("[TIhe Court is not at all
persuaded by the Reno and Bradbury opinions. Unlike the Olson and Cooper
OLC opinions, which are exhaustive efforts of sophisticated legal reasoning,
bolstered by extensive citation to judicial authority, the Reno and Bradbury OLC
opinions are for the most part conclusory and recursive. Neither cites to a single
judicial opinion recognizing the asserted absolute immunity.").
63 See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 60, at 1
(advising that the President has the constitutional authority to use military force
in Libya). Congress subsequently passed a resolution for the prompt withdrawal
of forces. H.R. Res. 292, 112th Cong., 1st. Sess. (2011) (enacted). Also, President
Bush's exercise of executive privilege in the dismissal of U.S. Attorneys, supported
by Paul D. Clement, Assertion of Executive Privilege Concerning the Dismissal
and Replacement of U.S. Attorneys (2007), was overturned by S. 214, 110th
Cong., Pub. L. No. 110-34 (2007) (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 546). See also
Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19
Op. O.L.C. 350, 350 (1995) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 458 does not apply to
presidential appointments of federal judges). Congress did not buy the argument,
opting to amend the statute to make it applicable to Article III judges. For a
summary, see David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL. L. REv. 453, 469 (2007).
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TABLE 4. "EXPANsIvE" MEMOS ON PRESIDENTIAL AND AGENCY
ACTION LITIGATED IN COURT
Memos Litigated in President Agencies
Court PresidenAgencie
Upheld 42% 60%
Overruled 50% 20%
Unreviewable (moot,
nonjusticiable, lacks 8% 20%
standing) I I _I
Put simply, agency actions backed by OLC opinions are
overruled at a lower rate than presidential actions backed by
OLC opinions. Although these numbers do not establish
causality,6 4 I surmise that agency actions are either more
thoroughly or more impartially vetted by the OLC. Of the two,
the latter is more likely. The OLC puts substantial effort into
drafting legal opinions for the President-the typical memo for
the President is much longer than that for the agencies. Thus,
while the OLC conducts a conceivably impartial legal analysis
for agency memos, its analysis for the President takes on a
much more partial and expansive interpretation of executive
powers. Hence, the data seems to validate Lund's observation
that while the OLC behaves similarly to an independent court
in formulating advice for the agencies, it acts as a private
attorney for the President.6 5
B. Case Studies
Close reading of OLC opinions reveals contrasting patterns
of deference between memos addressed to the President and
those addressed to the agencies. This subsection conducts one
case study comparing two different memos written for the Pres-
ident and an agency on a similar topic, as well as one case
study of a memo to the President.
OLC memos to the President and to the agencies are distin-
guishable in two ways. First, legal opinions written for the
President sometimes include a section of defense justifications
that would help prepare for possible litigation.6 6 Second, opin-
ions for agencies tend to be more tentative and cautious in
64 More advanced statistical analysis may establish causation, i.e.,
estimation through linear regression modeling.
65 Lund, supra note 31, at 498-500.
66 See, e.g., Bybee, §§ 2340-2340A, supra note 25, at 1, 39-46 (discussing
the standards of conduct under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A, as well as possible defenses to claims of violating the statute).
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assessing the legality of a desired course of action.6 7 These
distinctions suggest that the OLC perceives its advisory role
differently with regard to the President and agencies.
1. The "Torture Memos": OLC as Defense Attorneys for
the President but Independent Court for the
Agencies
In order to identify any difference in the deference paid to
the President as opposed to the agencies, I compare a memo to
the President and a memo to an agency that deal with a similar
legal question. Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee's memo
with the subject of "Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A," and his memo with the sub-
ject of "Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative," were drafted on
the same day by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo,
and then signed by Bybee. The memos are, respectively, ad-
dressed to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and
John Rizzo, Counsel to the CIA. Gonzales's question seems to
have been broader in scope, asking for the OLC's general opin-
ion regarding the standards of interrogation covered by the
statutes, while the latter's question seems to have been specifi-
cally whether the several types of interrogation techniques pro-
posed by the CIA would fall under the statute.6 8 Although both
memos permit "expansions" of power-indeed, it would be
strange for one memo to support the action while the other
opposed the same operation-there is substantial variation in
the memos' tones and what the memos include and exclude.
Typical of memos addressing the President, Bybee's memo
to Alberto Gonzales does not demonstrate an objective and rig-
orous analysis of the legality of the action. Rather, the memo
focuses on how the action may be defended to the courts, list-
67 See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen, to
Michael Vatis, Deputy Dir., Exec. Office for Nat'l Security 1 (Feb. 14, 1995),
https://www.Justice.gov/olc/page/file/936201/download [https://perma.cc/
JL3X-XP2X] (advising that courts are likely to adopt the "primary purpose" test
when the government collects foreign intelligence).
68 Bybee, §§ 2340-2340A, supra note 25, at 1 ("You have asked for our Of-
fice's views regarding the standards of conduct under the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment as
implemented by Sections 2340-2340A of title 18 of the United States Code.");
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to John Rizzo, Acting Gen.
Counsel of the CIA, on Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative 1 (Aug. 1, 2002),
[hereinafter Bybee, al-Qaeda Operative] https://www.Justice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/legacy/201 0/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCA6-
5FNVI ("You have asked for this Office's views on whether certain proposed con-
duct would violate the prohibition against torture found at Section 2340A of title
18 of the United States Code.").
[Vol. 103:757776
THE PARTIALITY NORM
ing a number of justifications "that would negate any claim
that certain interrogation methods violate the statute."69 Yoo
writes:
[We believe that under the current circumstances certain
justification defenses might be available that would poten-
tially eliminate criminal liability. Standard criminal law de-
fenses of necessity and self-defense could justify
interrogation methods . . . . We believe that a defense of
necessity could be raised, under the current circumstances,
to an allegation of a Section 2340A violation. 70
The inclusion of a list of defenses in advance of possible litiga-
tion is absent in the corresponding letter to Rizzo, and is un-
common in memos to agencies in general, when the OLC seems
to limit itself to giving straightforward advice on the legality of
the action in question.7 1 On the other hand, lists of potential
defenses are found in OLC memos supporting presidential ac-
tion. On issues for which the OLC "pushes the envelope" in
justifying the President's desired course of action, the OLC
sometimes writes a list of possible defenses in consideration of
future litigation.72
The two corresponding memos also take on very different
tones. To Gonzales, Yoo argues that even if the proposed action
violates the statute, the statute itself would be unconstitutional
for constraining a presidential prerogative: "[Wie conclude that
under the circumstances of the current war against al Qaeda
and its allies, application of Section 2340A to interrogations
undertaken pursuant to the President's Commander-in-Chief
powers may be unconstitutional."73
To Rizzo, however, Yoo finishes on a more cautious note:
[Wie conclude that the interrogation procedures that you pro-
pose would not violate Section 2340A. We wish to emphasize
that this is our best reading of the law; however, you should
69 Bybee, §§ 2340-2340A, supra note 25, at 1, 39-46.
70 Id. at 39.
71 It must be noted, however, that the OLC does act as the agencies' defense
counsel in the limited number of cases where the agencies seek to collect evidence
or intelligence-activities wholly geared towards litigation. See, e.g., Memoran-
dum from Dellinger, supra note 67, at 1 (advising that courts are likely to adopt
the "primary purpose" test when the government collects foreign intelligence).
72 See Cheney's Law: Interview, Charlie Savage, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 16,
2007), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/cheney/interviews/savage.
html [https://perma.cc/862U-7KFB]; see also Bybee, §§ 2340-2340A, supra note
25, at 1, 39-46 (discussing possible defenses).
73 Bybee, §§ 2340-2340A, supra note 25, at 46.
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be aware that there are no cases construing this statute, just
as there have been no prosecutions brought under it.7 4
Indeed, Yoo appears to warn Rizzo that the courts may not
accept the OLC's interpretation. This is consistent with Lund's
view that the OLC is reluctant to take on the blame for a possi-
ble overruling.75
2. OLC Is the President's Law Firm Even on Mundane
Issues
The OLC's position as the President's defense counsel per-
sists not only in "crisis-memos" but in mundane matters as
well. In 1984, for example, Assistant Attorney General Theo-
dore Olson advised the President on the application of a politi-
cal contribution limitation for executive branch officials.76
President Reagan's request was narrow: he asked for the OLC's
"analysis of the application of 18 U.S.C. § 603 ('section 603') to
political contributions made by certain Executive Branch of-
ficers and employees."7 7 In addition to answering the ques-
tion,78 the OLC provided a detailed analysis on how Reagan
could challenge the constitutionality of section 603.79 The OLC
advised Reagan that "courts may well find that section 603 is
unconstitutionally vague in its intended application, and/or
that it is neither supported by a sufficiently important state
interest nor drawn narrowly enough to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of First Amendment rights."8 0 It even recom-
mended that Reagan solicit political organizations to bring suit,
instructing that these organizations would have standing to
challenge the statute. 8 ' Therefore, the OLC did not merely
comment on the constitutionality of section 603. Rather, it
actively urged the President to challenge the statute in court to
74 Bybee, al-Qaeda Operatives, supra note 68, at 18 (emphasis added).
75 Lund, supra note 31, at 492-93.
76 Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Fred F.
Fielding, Counsel to the President 41-43 (Feb. 6, 1984), https://www.justice.gov/
olc/page/ffle/936116/download [https://perma.cc/98FV-EHHH].
77 Id. at 1.
78 The OLC held that all White House employees-including "Presidential
appointees subject to Senate confirmation who are either full-time or part-time
employees of the government . . . and Presidential appointees not subject to
Senate confirmation"-were prohibited from contributing to Reagan's re-election
campaign. Id. at 1 (quoting Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the
President, to Theodore B. Olsen, Assistant Att'y Gen. 1 (Nov. 14, 1983)).
79 Id. at 39-41. However, the OLC did acknowledge that as a matter of policy,
"[Tihe Department of Justice would vigorously defend the constitutionality of the
statute if it were challenged in court." Id. at 43.
80 Id. at 2.
81 Id. at 43.
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advance his agenda: "We therefore suggest that the legal inter-
ests of the individuals mentioned in your request would best be
served by commencement of a civil action seeking declaratory
and/or injunctive relief against enforcement of section 603."82
Thus, even in 1984-a year free of major American crises 83-
and on a mundane matter, the OLC acted not solely as advi-
sors, but also as Reagan's law firm, zealously advancing Rea-
gan's agenda even when Reagan did not request it of them. In
the end, Reagan apparently decided not to challenge the stat-
ute, and 18 U.S.C. § 603 still remains in effect.8 4
The episode repeated in 1997, when Deputy Assistant At-
torney General Richard Shiffrin advised the President regard-
ing removal of an executive official.85 Clinton asked the OLC
whether he could "remove, without cause, members of the Fed-
eral Housing Finance Board ('FHFB') and Railroad Retirement
Board ('RRB') who [were] serving in holdover capacities." 6
From the beginning, the OLC drafted the memo under the as-
sumption that a removed official would challenge the action in
court, stating that "although there is some small risk that a
court would find a tenure protection during the holdover pe-
riod, the clearly better legal view is that such a protection
should not be inferred." 7 Thus, the OLC does not only act as
the President's defense team when a crisis urges decisive yet
illegal action. The OLC's "Torture Memos" should not, there-
fore, be discounted as an aberration.8 8
82 IJ
83 See What Happened in 1984, ON THIS DAY, http://www.onthisday.com/
date/ 1984 [https://perma.cc/GGP2-H34A) (citing five "Significant Events," none
of which qualifies as an American crisis).
84 In 2012, a federal contractor challenged the constitutionality of this stat-
ute, but the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld it. See Wagner v.
FEC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 101, 112-13 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 717
F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
85 See Removal of Holdover Officials Serving on the Federal Housing Finance
Board and the Railroad Retirement Board, 21 Op. O.L.C. 135, 135 (1997) (advis-
ing President Clinton that he had the right to remove the holdover board members
without cause).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Cf. Andrew Cohen, The Torture Memos, 10 Years Later, THE ATIANTIC (Feb.
6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/02/the-torture-
memos- 10-years-later/252439/ [https://perma.cc/ZTV4-AX681 ("Right now, an-
other administration is justifying another extraordinary departure from American
legal policy-the assassination of U.S. citizens abroad, with drone strikes, in a
secret manner, without affording those citizens any due process.").
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III
DISCUSSION
The data supports the hypothesis that OLC legal opinions
give greater systematic deference to the President than to agen-
cies, to which it renders more impartial advice. Moreover,
whereas the OLC acts almost as an independent court in for-
mulating advice for the agencies, it often assumes the role of
private attorney for the President.8 9
What, then, accounts for the OLC's deference toward the
President? Several explanations relate to formal structures of
accountability. First, the OLC heads are formally accountable
to the President, which creates strong incentives to defer to the
White House in issuing legal counsel. The OLC head's "interest
in giving congenial advice is readily explained: by doing so he
protects his position, retains influence with the President and
Attorney General, and advances his prospects of promotion."9 0
The Assistant Attorney General and the three Deputy As-
sistant Attorneys General who run the OLC are traditionally
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.9 1
That OLC heads are politically appointed and replaced with
each presidency implies that OLC heads are chosen not only
because they are "competent attorneys" but also because they
are "politically and philosophically attuned to the policies of the
administration," 9 2 or, in other words, maintain "reputations for
holding views of the law that are welcome in the administration
in which they serve."93
It also implies that the White House exercises great influ-
ence over promotions as well as dismissals. How the White
House perceives OLC work can determine the course of the
attorneys' careers.94 The White House and the Attorney Gen-
eral "hold the keys to some of the most desirable appointments
to which lawyers aspire."9 5 In the past few decades, heads of
the OLC, more than any other position in government, have
89 See supra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
90 McGinnis, supra note 14, at 422.
91 According to Jack Goldsmith, however, the OLC has only been led by a
Senate-confirmed head for roughly five out of the last twenty-one years. See Jack
Goldsmith, The Decline of OLC, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:11 PM), https://
lawfareblog.com/decline-olc [https://perma.cc/RD25-9RXA].
92 GOLDSMnH, supra note 8, at 34.
93 Lund, supra note 31, at 502.
94 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 170-71 (describing how Vice President
Dick Cheney's Chief of Staff, David Addington, used his clout to preclude promis-
ing, talented young lawyers from advancing because they had obstructed Adding-
ton's path in the past).
95 Lund, supra note 31, at 499-500.
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gone on to become Supreme Court Justices. Notables include
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia.
Because the White House can dismiss OLC leadership
without cause, an attorney may lose his or her position for
issuing opinions opposing White House objectives. Former
head of the OLC Roger C. Cramton was dismissed after refus-
ing to support President Nixon in his attempt to withhold ap-
propriated funds.9 6 Thus, the President's control over
appointments and dismissals creates incentives and pressure
for OLC heads to issue deferential legal opinions for the White
House.
Perhaps more important than formal structures are infor-
mal hierarchies that govern the relationships between the
White House and the DOJ, exposing the OLC to significant
pressure from above. Lund observes that the "relationship be-
tween OLC and the White House Counsel's office (which usu-
ally serves as the principal point of contact) can be quite
informal and collaborative, much like the relationship between
in-house counsel and outside counsel in private practice."9 7
Such informal relationships can create "informal pressure," an
"extraordinarily effective method of stifling disagreement and
guiding decisions in the way top management desires."98
Within the Bush administration, it was Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, and David Addington, the Vice Presi-
dent's Chief of Staff, who exercised inordinate influence over
Justice Department promotions, the substance of OLC legal
opinions, and the method by which opinions would be
drafted.99 Goldsmith writes how Addington, a powerful figure,
prevented certain non-party-liners from receiving promotions
in the Justice Department.10 0 Goldsmith writes:
[Gonzales and Addington] did not always acquiesce in OLC
opinions that reached uncongenial conclusions. Addington
in particular had a reputation for ensuring that those who
crossed swords with him never received White House ap-
proval for advancement, even when it was widely believed
that approval was deserved. I was immune to this pres-
sure . . . . But others were not. 101
96 See Blaine Friedlander, Roger Cranton, Former Cornell Law Dean, Dies at
87, CORNELL CHRON. (Feb. 7, 2017), http://news.comell.edu/stories/2017/02/
roger-cramton-forrner-comell-law-dean-dies-87 Ihttps://perMa.cc/7ZJX-CUT5].
97 Lund, supra note 31, at 498.
98 Shane, supra note 12, at 512.
99 GOLDSMYTH, supra note 8, at 169-72.
100 See d. at 170-71.
101 Id.
2018]1 781
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The possibility of promotion and dismissal are not the only
sources of pressure-there are constant requests from the
White House to stay in line with the President's agenda, creat-
ing political pressure that "is unavoidably immense .... [OLC
officials] are regularly present at White House meetings. And in
this climate, there is simply no way that OLC's aspiration to be
a neutral decision-maker can play out in practice."10 2
In comparison, the incentives for the OLC to cater to the
agencies are far weaker. The costs of approving questionable
agency programs may outweigh the benefits: If the OLC sup-
ports an agency initiative, "the benefits will still be captured
almost entirely by the client agency, while the costs of taking a
legally aggressive position will largely be borne by OLC."10 3
Unlike for presidential initiatives, the OLC suffers compara-
tively little cost for not approving an agency initiative that may
be legally ambiguous.
Unfortunately, the OLC faces "little or no oversight or pub-
lic accountability"10 4 to counteract pressures from the White
House. In fact, OLC heads suffer few personal costs for writing
deferential memos for the President. Despite a report by the
Office of Professional Responsibility that Yoo and Bybee had
committed "professional misconduct" by drafting and signing
the 2002 "Torture Memos,"10 5 the former OLC officials were
acquitted by David Margolis, the Associate Deputy Attorney
General. 106 They were not referred to the state bar, and contin-
ued to practice (Bybee is now a federal circuit judge; Yoo is on
the faculty at Berkeley Law School).107
Although OLC heads may have an interest in maintaining
the OLC's reputation as independent and impartial-"prestige
and reputation of the office will be what will enhance his status
as he returns to private practice" 0 8-OLC attorneys do not
always uphold those standards. The public is prevented from
viewing many sensitive written opinions, and the memos that
102 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2337 (2006).
103 Lund, supra note 31, at 494.
104 GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 33.
105 OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES REIATING TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED
TERRORIsTS 11 (2009).
106 Memorandum from Margolis, supra note 61, at 2.
107 Id.; Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror
Memos, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/
politics/20justice.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cC/ZTH3-BK56].
108 McGinnis, supra note 14, at 422.
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are revealed tend to be disclosed years after the action has
occurred.10 9 This does not mean, however, that the OLC al-
ways feels pressured to say "yes" to the President, "especially
with respect to issues in which the White House or the Attorney
General has not appeared to take any strong interest."' 10
Although the degree of informally originating pressures on
the OLC is likely to vary across administrations-according to
the type of people installed in the White House, the White
House culture, the strength of hierarchical relations, as well as
the distinct situations facing the administration-the OLC con-
sistently risks succumbing to White House pressures.
IV
POSSIBLE REMEDIES
In the aftermath of the "Torture Memos," the OLC issued
two best practices guidelines in 2005 and 2010, encouraging
its lawyers to render more thorough and impartial advice.'1 1
The 2010 memorandum presents the following principles:
* OLC must provide advice based on its best understanding
of what the law requires-not simply an advocate's de-
fense of the contemplated action or position proposed by
an agency or the Administration.1 1 2
* [Iln rendering legal advice, OLC seeks to provide an accu-
rate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that
appraisal will constrain the Administration's or an
agency's pursuit of desired practices or policy
objectives." 3
* [OLC] should strive to ensure that it candidly and fairly
addresses the full range of relevant legal sources and sig-
nificant arguments on all sides of a question.114
* OLC's analyses may appropriately reflect its responsibili-
ties, which include facilitating the work of the Executive
Branch and the objectives of the President, consistent
with the law.11 5
109 It is unclear how beneficial frequent disclosure would be. It is also never
clear what degree of partiality in the legal analysis will earn public praise or
approbation. Ultimately, whether an opinion is praised or criticized may depend
not on the quality of the legal analysis, but on how well the executive action is
received by the public, after the fact. Had public opinion largely favored harsh
methods of interrogation for terrorists, Yoo's memos likely would not have been
singled out as unsound legal advice.
110 Lund, supra note 31, at 501.
11 See Memorandum from Barron, supra note 23, at 1-2.
112 1& at 1.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2.
115 1&
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However, in the face of significant political pressure, such self-
imposed and self-policing guidelines are difficult to uphold. In-
deed, as my empirical results suggest, the OLC's internal com-
mitments to impartiality yield to strong incentives for acting
partially. Unfortunately, there are few external mechanisms
that adequately monitor the OLC, and few internal incentives
for the OLC to act otherwise. Without proper accountability or
incentives, internal norms of impartiality "are unlikely to be
self-sustaining." 11 6
Below, I introduce and evaluate several informal and struc-
tural remedies scholars have suggested. I then propose what I
believe to be the best option for making the OLC more indepen-
dent and impartial.
A. Informal Remedies
Some scholars suggest that increased routine disclosure of
OLC opinions would increase transparency and force OLC offi-
cials to be accountable to the public. 117 Systematized disclo-
sure would "protect[ I against fringe views, since the author of
an opinion knows that outside audiences will .. . quickly dis-
cover and critique views that distort the relevant law."' 1 8 Dis-
closure would also "allow[ I Congress, professional peers, and
the public to see distortions as they emerge and campaign to
correct them."1 19 Indeed, the OLC seems to be making a con-
certed effort to do so. President Obama's 2009 memorandum
encouraged agencies to "disclose information rapidly in forms
that the public can readily find and use." 120
The problem is that the OLC does not possess a "monopoly
over the provision of legal advice within the government"' 2 1 -
the White House may stop relying on the OLC for legal advice
as disclosures increase, depending instead on agency lawyers.
In recent years, the number of lawsuits demanding that the
OLC disclose opinions has soared,1 22 which some say has
116 Shane, supra note 12, at 518.
117 See, e.g., Setty, supra note 13, at 602-05 (discussing the benefits of intro-
ducing mandatory OLC disclosures).
118 Margulies, supra note 36, at 844.
119 Id.
120 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
121 Lund, supra note 31, at 488.
122 See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 846
F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (suit brought to compel OLC to meet disclo-
sure obligations under FOIA's "reading-room" provision, which requires agencies
to make certain records, such as final opinions in adjudication of cases, available
electronically); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 844 F.3d 126 (2d
Cir. 2016) (suit under FOIA to compel OLC disclosure of documents setting forth
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made the President reluctant to rely on OLC advice. 1 2 3 The
rising frequency of OLC disclosures may be linked to the grow-
ing influence of the White House Counsel and the general
counsels of agencies and departments during the Obama ad-
ministration, while "OLC's authority and influence . .. in gen-
eral diminished by comparison to prior administrations." 124
Rumors of the OLC's decline circulated rapidly after it was
disclosed that Obama did not consult with the Attorney Gen-
eral or the OLC-opting instead to rely on lawyers from the CIA,
the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Pentagon-in drafting memos that justified the Navy SEAL op-
eration killing Osama bin Laden in 2011.125
Others have suggested that the OLC create a regime of
stare decisis for OLC opinions.12 6 If "[tihe concern is that OLC
government's reasoning on legality of targeted drone strikes on U.S. citizens); N.Y.
Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 806 F.3d 682, 683 (2d Cir. 2015) (suit under
FOIA seeking disclosure of OLC documents related to targeted drone strikes on
U.S. citizens); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 756 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir.
2014) (same); Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 184 (2d Cir. 2012) (suit under FOIA to compel OLC to
disclose documents relating to the enforcement of pledge requirements imposed
by U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act and Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2012) (suit under FOIA to compel OLC
disclosure of documents relating to CIA detainees); Samahon v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, No. 13-6462, 2015 WL 857358, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2015) (suit
brought under FOIA seeking disclosure of OLC documents on presidential power
to make recess appointments during pro forma sessions of the Senate); Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 1:06-CV-214 (RCL), 2014 WL
1279280, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2014) (suit under FOIA to compel disclosure of
OLC memos relating to NSA's post-9/11 warrantless wire-tapping program); N.Y.
Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 12 Civ. 3215 (JSR), 2013 WL 174222, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013) (suit under FOIA seeking disclosure of OLC documents on
presidential power to make recess appointments during pro forma sessions of the
Senate).
123 See Goldsmith, supra note 91.
124 See id.
125 Charlie Savage, How 4 Federal Lawyers Paved the Way to Kill Osama bin
Laden, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/
politics/obama-legal-authorization-osama-bin-laden-raid.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/R5B4-QWQY]. Professor Michael Dorf at Cornell Law School writes on
this issue: "[I1t is to be expected that lawyers in particular departments or agen-
cies will tend to take the perspective that the department or agency favors on
policy grounds. If you go to lawyers for the military or the intelligence ser-
vices, ceterts paribus, they will favor the conclusion that a proposed use of force is
lawful. But it is precisely because of this kind of risk that, over time, OLC has
come to be valued as a legal unit within the executive branch that tells it like it is."
Michael Dorf, Why Didn't Obama Ask OLC About the bin Laden Raid?, DORF ON
LAw (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/11/why-didnt-
obama-ask-olc-about-bin-laden.html [https://perma.cc/U94D-DLJNI.
126 See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 10, at 1475-81 (discussing the role of
precedent in the OLC).
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might succumb to its clients' short-run policy interests by too
readily answering 'yes' [and] . ... overruling OLC precedent
whenever it stands in the way of the client's current prefer-
ences," 127 then a "commit[ment] to follow those precedents over
the immediate policy preferences of its clients"128 may help
curtail such deference. However, some argue that "[sitare deci-
sis works because courts handle scores or hundreds of cases
with similar facts."l 29 Rather than resolve comparable dis-
putes, most OLC work involves "little prospect for recurrence in
exactly the same form. In this sparser decisional environment,
stare decisis is not as useful." 3 0
Another idea is for the OLC to implement a "substantive
test" when writing opinions: executive actions that "push[ I] the
envelope" must not violate constitutional norms, must have a
"compelling sovereignty- or human rights-centered rationale,"
and "must have a reasonable chance of ratification" by Con-
gress. 11 Despite Margulies's attempts to define such potential
sovereignty and human rights rationales, the boundaries of
what this constitutes can easily be construed in ways that
render the benefits of such a test moot. The ratification re-
quirement is even more problematic. Under the requirement,
the OLC must have a "reasonable expectation that Congress
would either specifically endorse the President's decision
through an affirmative act or acquiesce in the decision, or a
reasonable belief that Congress has already authorized the de-
cision."1 32 In the context of a divided and polarized govern-
ment, wherein Congress might oppose a presidential initiative
not for lack of merit but for partisan reasons, such a require-
ment would be unprofitable and cumbersome.
Barring the aforementioned defects, the problem that
arises in informal and internal codes is that of persistent self-
enforcement. While adherence to such codes will vary with the
individual head of the OLC and the context, internal commit-
ments are likely to succumb to structural incentives when po-
litical pressures soar and incentives to resist are scant.
127 Id. at 1497.
128 Id.
129 Margulies, supra note 36, at 846.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 851.
132 Id. at 853.
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B. Structural Modifications
1. Supreme Executive Tribunal
Formal structural modifications are necessary to remedy
what appears to be primarily a structural issue involving the
hierarchical institutions between the White House and the
OLC. 13 3 If the informal solutions proposed above are surface-
level remedies for what is inherently a problem of political pres-
sure originating in the President's control over OLC appoint-
ments and tenure, then a more effective solution would be to
modify this arrangement.
One such remedy, albeit one that seems particularly diffi-
cult to implement, is the creation of a "Supreme Executive
Tribunal," an institution of nine members appointed by the
President with Senate confirmation, who will serve as "judges
for the executive branch" over staggered twelve-year terms and
will assume the OLC's adjudicatory duties.1 3 4 The OLC will
function primarily as presidential "advocates," and its opinions
"will have only provisional authority, subject to full-dress adju-
dication by the Executive Tribunal."13 5 The OLC "will be pre-
paring for the next case before the tribunal-and they will
rightly fear that extreme positions will only serve to alienate the
judges." 13 6
The list of potential objections to this proposal is
lengthy.137 However, the most conspicuous objection is that
the Tribunal would greatly encumber the process of executive
legislation, potentially drawing out pending proposals "for
weeks or months," and having a "particularly deleterious im-
pact on foreign policy matters, where a timely move may be
necessary."13 8 Other objections are more thought-provoking:
the Tribunal would most likely adjudicate cases involving polit-
ical questions that are nonjusticiable in the courts.1 39 Whether
this is desirable, however, is open to debate: Despite the lack of
mechanisms to keep the executive accountable, "[clourts stay
their hand in these matters to allow Congress and the Presi-
133 See Katyal, supra note 102, at 2319-22, 2336 n.83. Katyal goes so far as
to argue that the lapse of judgment shown by certain OLC lawyers in the wake of
9/11 cannot be entirely blamed on them, but rather on the "structural design of
the modem executive branch." Id.
134 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 143
(2010).
135 Id. at 144.
136 Id. at 145.
137 See Margulies, supra note 36, at 834-36.
138 Id. at 836.
139 See id. at 835.
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dent to work out their differences on policy matters. Many of
these matters may lack clear standards that facilitate judicial
review or may address contexts such as foreign policy, where
the nation should speak with one voice."1 40
2. Director of Adjudication
Yet another proposal suggests the creation of a "Director of
Adjudication" position to assume the OLC's adjudicatory func-
tions.141 The OLC would function solely as an adviser, while
the Director, reminiscent of the Tribunal, would act as an im-
partial judge. The Director "would not hold tenure for life, but
rather for periods of four years that straddle presidential terms,
subject only to removal for cause."' 42 This proposal unneces-
sarily complicates procedures without bringing much advan-
tage. The President is likely to bypass the Director rather than
risk the possibility of an overrule being reported. He would, as
Margulies notes, "secure advice elsewhere, such as from the
White House Counsel" or the agencies.1 4 3 Second, it is unclear
whether creating such a position would have advantages be-
yond the benefits of non-removable tenure. The Director may
be just as vulnerable to White House pressure as the head of
the OLC-the only difference being that the former is subject to
for-cause removal and straddles presidential terms. Instead of
installing a new Director, why not make the OLC head subject
to the same terms?
3. For-Cause Removal for the OLC
Another solution to OLC bias is to make OLC lawyers re-
movable only for cause or to grant them tenure of office. Until
its repeal in 1889, the Tenure of Office Act (requiring the con-
sent of the Senate to fire some officers) encompassed many
DOJ lawyers, protecting them from arbitrary removal.144 There
is reason to believe, in fact, that the creators of the DOJ did not
include a tenure provision in the DOJ's organic statute solely
because of the Tenure of Office Act.14 5 Considering contempo-
140 Id.
141 Katyal, supra note 102, at 2337.
142 Id.
143 Margulies, supra note 36, at 837-38.
IL44 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Jus-
tice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REv. 121,
165, 169 (2014).
145 See id. at 165.
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rary bias within the OLC, it may be necessary to once again
grant their lawyers tenure. 146
Does Congress have the power to grant tenure to the Office
of Legal Counsel? It most likely does. Although the Supreme
Court did initially seem to draw a distinction between "quasi-
legislative" or "quasi-Judicial" agencies and "purely executive
officers,"147 the Court has since abandoned this framework.1 4 8
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court explained:
The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not
to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may
not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that
Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of
the "executive power" and his constitutionally appointed duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" under Arti-
cle 11.149
Thus, "[Tihe real question is whether the removal restrictions
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to
perform his constitutional duty, and the functions ... in ques-
tion must be analyzed in that light."' 50
Therefore, it is important to look at precedent to determine
whether restricting removability of OLC lawyers-i.e., the As-
sistant Attorney General and other Department of Justice at-
torneys-will unduly impede the President in his or her
exercise of executive power. The OLC lawyers provide counsel.
They do not regulate rates on any good or service, like the
postmaster in Myers did. 15 1 Nor does the OLC enforce any law,
like the independent counsel at issue in Morrison.15 2 Thus,
although the OLC assists the President in performing his or her
executive functions, the Office does not perform a specific exec-
utive function. In other words, a President would not be pre-
vented from performing any executive power because of a
noncompliant OLC.
146 But see icL at 170 ("ITihe Department of Justice, over the long term, devel-
oped the norms of professional independence envisioned by Representative
Jenckes and its congressional architects.").
147 Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132-34, 177 (1926) (holding
that a restriction on removability of postmasters violated the Take Care clause),
with Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (holding that a
restriction on removability of a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative agency did not
violate the Take Care clause).
148 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988).
149 Id. at 689-90.
150 Id. at 691.
151 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 177.
152 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
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Moreover, precedent supports Congress's ability to restrict
removability of OLC officers. In Wiener v. United States, the
Court held that officers of the War Claims Commission could
only be removed for cause, because Congress could not have
intended the commissioners to exercise their duties while fear-
ing "the Damocles' sword of removal by the President for no
reason other than that he preferred to have . .. men of his own
choosing."153 Just as the officers of the War Claims Comiis-
sion would function best when protected from removal, so
could the OLC provide better advice when "the Damocles'
sword of removal" is withdrawn from their necks.
Congress has broad discretion to decide how robustly to
insulate an agency from the President. "A robust approach
would specify that refusing to take a legally frivolous position is
not cause for termination," whereas "[a] more modest approach
would rely on the general for-cause standard approved in
Humphrey's Executor."1 4 A simple statute formally establish-
ing the OLC as an agency and specifying the removability of
OLC officers in conformity to Humphrey's Executor would be
sufficient to make the OLC an independent agency. 155
Would tenure address the problem of bias within the OLC?
At the very least, tenure or for-cause removal would make the
OLC an independent agency as a matter of law. "Independence
is a legal term of art in public law, referring to agencies headed
by officials that the President may not remove without
cause."15 6 Similarly in practice, for-cause removal has the ef-
fect of insulating agencies from politics, because "a President
who cannot remove the personnel of the agency for policy dis-
agreements lacks a key method to impose administration
views." 5 7 Agencies are thus able to act based on their exper-
tise without bending wholly to the President's agenda. For this
153 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
154 Spaulding, supra note 35, at 435.
155 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687. There are, of course, limitations. Congress
likely could not make the attorney general and the OLC removable for cause only.
Such a dual for-cause limitation would likely run afoul of Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
156 Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw 333, 347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds.,
2010).
157 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REv. 599, 611 (2010). Some scholars dispute this
conclusion. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REv. 769, 814 (2013) (asserting
that the President's power of removal is an "imperfect tool" for imposing policy
preferences); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions ofAgency Independence, 113 COLUM.
L. REv. 1163, 1194 (2013) (applying a conventionalist perspective to removal).
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reason, tenure has been traditionally viewed as the antecedent
to professionalism. 15s For the same reason, limiting the Presi-
dent's removal power would encourage OLC attorneys to ex-
hibit "dispassionate professional Judgment."15 9
Of course, completely isolating the OLC from the President
will defeat the purpose of the OLC. If the OLC is filled with
holdover tenured attorneys of the opposite party, the President
is unlikely to seek their advice. Such an OLC would also op-
pose the agenda of the new President on ideological, rather
than legal, grounds. This hypothetical OLC would be at stark
odds with what the President requires of it, and according to
Katyal:
[T]he political pressure on OLC officials is unavoidably im-
mense. They are, after all, political appointees themselves-
the head of the Office and all the deputies are politically
appointed. They are expected not only to adjudicate disputes
but also to advise the President, and they are regularly pre-
sent at White House meetings. And in this climate, there is
simply no way that OLC's aspiration to be a neutral decision-
maker can play out in practice. Simply put, they are lawyers
with a client to serve. 16 0
For-cause removal would not, however, alienate the OLC from
the President because it preserves some political accountability
of agency heads. After all, "The President appoints the heads of
almost all independent agencies, the chairs of multimember
agencies, and the administrators of single-head agencies."161
Even if the President could not remove the agency officials at-
will, he or she could still fill the agency with like-minded indi-
viduals who would, in general, support his or her agenda. Ac-
cordingly, the OLC would be encouraged to exercise their
expertise without fear of reprisal while maintaining some level
of allegiance to the President. Thus, the best method of reme-
dying OLC bias is to protect OLC heads and lawyers from arbi-
trary removal.
CONCLUSION
This study has shown that the OLC does not offer "de-
tached, apolitical legal advice" in practice. Rather, the OLC is
deeply and systematically deferential to the President. The im-
plications are grave considering the OLC's de facto lawmaking
158 See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 157, at 611-12.
159 Id. at 612.
160 Katyal, supra note 102, at 2337 (footnote omitted).
161 Datla & Revesz, supra note 157, at 818.
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power, a result of its position as legal adviser for the execu-
tive-Ithe judgment of [the OLC] . . . becomes the law." 162
Moreover, the OLC "is frequently asked to opine on issues of
first impression that are unlikely to be resolved by the courts-
a circumstance in which OLC's advice may effectively be the
final word on the controlling law."' 6 3 Whether the OLC facili-
tates the extra-constitutional and extra-legal expansion of ex-
ecutive powers depends on the implementation of sufficient
remedies for the problem of partiality.
The issue of OLC deference is particularly pertinent con-
sidering that numerous executive orders issued by the current
President have been successfully challenged in federal
courts.164 As the OLC verifies the legality of all executive ac-
tion,165 excessive bias will only damage the administration.
Given the recent scrutiny of presidential action, the OLC must
commit to giving legal advice that ensures the legality and con-
stitutionality of executive action.
162 Cheney's Law: Interview, Charlie Savage, supra note 72.
163 Memorandum from Barron, supra note 23, at 1.
164 See, e.g., Hawal'i v. Trump, CV. NO. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL
1011673, at *17 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017) (granting a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the enforcement of President Trump's executive order banning travel
into the United States from various countries).
165 Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 7.
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APPENDIX 1 - "CRISIS" MEMOS
Notes on the table. "Date" is written in "Month, Year" format.
"Memo" column includes the memo name, shortened for the
sake of brevity. "Recipient" is the individual to whom the memo
was addressed. "Author" is the name of the individual who
composed the memo. "Topic" column designates whether a
given memo discusses a matter of domestic concern (desig-
nated "D") or of foreign concern (designated "F"). "Position"
column designates whether a given memo argued for expansive
view of presidential powers (designated "E") or argued for lim-
ited presidential powers (designated "L").
Date Memo Recipient Author Topic Position
Apr., Military Force in Libya AG Krass F E
11
July, Lethal Operations Against AG Barron F E
10 Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi
Feb., Lethal Operations Against AG Barron F E
10 Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi
May, Review of Legality of AG Goldsmith D E
04 STELLAR WIND
Mar., "Protected Person" Status in President Goldsmith F E
04 Iraq Under Geneva
Convention
Mar., Deployment of United States President Goldsmith F E
04 Armed Forces to Haiti
Jan., Authority to Protect National President Yoo D E
03 Security Information
Dec., Omissions in Iraq's WMD Vice Yoo F E
02 Declaration President
Nov., U.N. Resolution, Int'l Law, President Yoo F E
02 and Force in Iraq
Oct., Military Force Against Iraq President Bybee F E
02
Aug., Standards of Conduct for President Bybee F E
02 Interrogation
Aug., Legality of Interrogation for President Yoo F E
02 al Qaeda Operatives
July, Patriot Act & National Deputy Bybee D E
02 Security Affairs AG
Feb., Status of Taliban Forces President Bybee F E
02 Under Geneva Convention of
1949
Treaties and Laws to al President Bybee F E
Jan., Qaeda and Taliban
02 Detainees
2018] 793
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Nov., Suspend Certain Provisions
01 of the ABM Treaty
President Yoo,
Delahunty
F E
Nov., Legality of the Use of President Philbin F E
01 Military Commissions to Try
Terrorists
Nov., Persons Captured by US President Yoo, F E
01 Armed Forces in Afghanistan Delahunty
Oct., Force to Combat Terrorist President Yoo, D E
01 Within the United States Delahunty
Sept., Force Against Terrorists and President Yoo F E
01 Nations Supporting Them
Sept., Amending Foreign Assoc. Yoo F E
01 Intelligence Surveillance Dep. AG
Dec., Authorization for Continuing AG Moss F E
00 Hostilities in Kosovo
May, Military Operations in AG Moss F E
99 Kosovo
June, Legislative Provision President Dellinger F E
96 Regarding ABM Treaty
May, Placing of U.S. Armed Forces President Dellinger F E
96 Under U.N. Control and NSC
Nov., Proposed Deployment of U.S. President Dellinger F E
95 Armed Forces into Bosnia
Nov., Presidential Discretion & President Dellinger D E
95 Chemical & Bio. Weapons and NSC
Sept., Deployment of United States Four US Dellinger F E
94 Armed Forces into Haiti Senators
Dec., Authority to Use United President Flanigan F E
92 States Military Forces In
Somalia
Feb., Issues Raised by Foreign President Barr F E
90 Relations Authorization Bill
July, Congressional Notification AG Barr F E
89 for Certain CIA Covert
Actions
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APPENDIX 2 - PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDA
Notes on the table. The "date" column is written in "month,
year" format. The "memo" column includes the memo name,
shortened for the sake of brevity. The "recipient" column refers
to the individual to whom the memo was addressed. The "au-
thor" column refers to the name of the individual who com-
posed the memo. The "topic" column designates whether a
given memo discusses a matter of domestic concern (desig-
nated "D") or of foreign concern (designated "F"). The "position"
column designates whether a given memo argued for expansive
view of presidential powers (designated "E") or argued for lim-
ited presidential powers (designated "L"). The "Result" column
expounds on whether a given memo was rejected in court
("Oc"), opposed in academia ("Oa"), opposed by a political body
such as Congress ("Op"), not opposed ("N"), supported by a
political body ("Sp"), supported in academia ("Sa"), or upheld in
court ("Se").
Date Memo Recipient Author Topic Position Result
Jan., Anti-Nepotism President Koffsky D E N
17
Aug., National Emergency Act President Thompson D L N
16
July, Immunity from President Thompson D E S1
14 Subpoena
June, Exec. Privilege: Congress President Holder D E Oe167
12 on Fast and Furious
Jan., Recess Appointments President Seitz D E Oe168
12 Senate
May, Bills Presented President Cedarbaum D E N
11 Electronically
Apr., White House Employee President Thompson D E N
11 Sick Leave.
Apr., Military Force in Libya AG Krass F E OP
11
July, Lethal Operations AG Barron F E Se170
10 Against al-Aulaqi
166 See Jennifer Bendery, Darrell Issa Abruptly Ends Hearing Before Witness
Can Debunk His White House Attacks, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 17, 2014), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/16/darrell-issa-hearing-n_5592009.html
[https://perma.cc/B79G-LWRD].
167 Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v.
Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 121 (D.D.C 2016).
168 NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014).
169 H.R. Res. 292, 112th Cong., 1st. Sess. (2011) (rebuking the decision). A
court case challenging the decision failed, however it was due to mootness.
Whitney v. Obama, 845 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (D.D.C. 2012).
170 Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 80 (D.D.C. 2014).
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Feb., Re: Lethal Operation AG Barron F E S.' 7 1
10 Against al-Aulaqi
Dec., President's Receipt of President Barron F E N
09 Nobel Prize
Oct., Remove Fed. President Barron D E N
09 Coordinator for Alaska
Natural Gas
July, Retired Military Officer President Koffsky D E N
09 for Appointment in
NASA
June, Constitutionality of Dep't of Barron F E N
09 Foreign Appropriations State
____[Act
July, Exec. Privilege Special President Mukasey D E Oc172
08 Counsel
June, Exec. Privilege EPA President Mukasey D E N
08 Ozone
Feb., DOJ Prosecute White AG Bradbury D E Oc
08 House
Sept., President to name Acting President Bradbury D E Sc
07 AG
Aug., Is Office of Admin. an President Engel D E Sc175
07 "Agency"
July, Presidential Records Act President Bradbury D L N
07
July, Immunity of Former President Bradbury D E O,176
07 Counsel from
Congressional Testimony
June, Exec. Privilege in President Clement D E O1
07 Dismissal of US
Attorneys
Sept., Appointments to the President Bradbury D E N
05 Board of the Legal
Services Corporation
171 Id.
172 Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp.
2d 53, 108 (D.D.C. 2008).
173 Id.
174 United States v. Baldwin, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1186 (D.N.M. 2008).
175 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Office of Admin., 566
F.3d 219, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
176 Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 104 ("Unlike the Olson and Cooper OLC opinions,
which are exhaustive efforts of sophisticated legal reasoning, bolstered by
extensive citation to judicial authority, the Reno and Bradbury OLC opinions are
for the most part conclusory and recursive. Neither cites to a single judicial
opinion recognizing the asserted absolute immunity. Indeed, the three-page
Bradbury OLC opinion was hastily issued on the same day that the President
instructed Ms. Miers to invoke absolute immunity, and it relies almost exclusively
upon the conclusory Reno OLC opinion and a statement from a memorandum
written by then-Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist in 1971.").
177 Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, S. 214, 110th
Cong., Pub. L. No. 110-34 (2007) (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 546).
796
July, Sign a Bill by Directing President Nielson, Jr. D E N
05 That His Signature Be
Affixed to It
Mar., Emoluments Clause & President Francisco D E N
05 Member of the Council
on Bioethics
Jan., Status of Director of CIA President Marshall D E N
05 Under the NSRA of 2004
Dec., Political Balance President Levin D L N
04 Requirement for the Civil
Rights Comm'n
May, Review of the Legality of AG Goldsmith D E O1
04 Stellar Wind Program
Mar., Geneva Convection, President Goldsmith F E Oc179
04 Protected Person Status
in Occupied Iraq
Mar., Deployment of United President Goldsmith F E N
04 States Armed Forces to
Haiti
Jan., Privilege Over Reagan President Goldsmith D E SC18o
04 Administration Records
Sept., Removal of Amtrak's President Whelan D E N
03 Reform Board
June, Designation of Acting President Whelan D E N
03 Director of the OMB
May, Contributions to the President Whelan D E N
03 President's Re-Election
Committee
Feb., Appointment of Member President Whelan D E N
03 of Holocaust Memorial
Council
Jan., uthority to Protect President Yoo D E O181
03 National Security
Information
Dec., Omissions in Iraq's Vice Yoo F E 0a182
02 WMD Declaration President
Nov., Designation of Acting President Whelan D E N
02 Solicitor of Labor
178 Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 61, at Al.
179 In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 583 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(limiting the validity of the advice only to al-gaeda members).
180 Am. Hist. Ass'n v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 402 F. Supp. 2d 171,
184 (D.D.C. 2005).
181 Steven Aftergood, OLC: President May Withhold WMD Info from Congress,
FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Aug. 26, 2015), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/08/
olc-nsi/ [https://perma.cc/Z3KV-TW671.
182 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The International Law of Force and the Fight
Against Terrorism, 21 DEL. LAW 18, 20 (2003) (recognizing logical and legal flaws in
the memorandum).
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Nov., U.N. Resolution, Int'l President Yoo F E O1
02 Law, and Force in Iraq
Nov., Signing of the H.J. Res. President Whelan D E N
02 124
Oct., Military Force Against President Bybee F E N
02 Iraq
Aug., Standards of Conduct President Bybee F E O1
02 for Interrogation
Aug., Legality of interrogation President Yoo F E Op1 8 5
02 used for al Qaeda
operatives
July, Patriot Act & National Deputy AG Bybee D E O1
02 Security Affairs
May, Applicability of President Bybee D E N
02 Ineligibility Clause to
Tony P. Hall
Mar., Border Control Policy President Yoo D L N
02 Under the Attorney
General
Feb., Status of Taliban Forces President Bybee F E Oc187
02 Under Geneva
Convention of 1949
Jan., Treaties and Laws to al President Bybee F E Oc188
02 Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees
183 Andru E. Wall, Was the 2003 Invasion of Iraq Legal?, 86 INT'L L. STUD. 69,
passim (2010) (remarking on the international condemnation of the invasion as
contrary to the U.N. resolution).
184 Memorandum from Margolis, supra note 61, at 68 (condemning Bybee and
Yoo's memoranda as exhibiting poor judgment). It is also important to note that
Bybee and Yoo were initially charged with professional misconduct for composing
the torture memoranda. OFF. OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 105, at 11.
185 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
186 Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Another Tortured Memo from Jay Bybee,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/another-tortured-memo-ay-bybee [https://perma.cc/AEF3-ZKK]
(challenging the memo as inconsistent, conclusory, and "tortured").
187 In 2005, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that Taliban
detainees counted as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. See In re
Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 479-80 (D.D.C. 2005). This
decision was vacated, however, in 2009 in Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539,
548-49 (D.C. Cir. 2009), but only because of changes in habeas corpus law. The
Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 553 (2004) (Souter, J.,
concurring), disagreed that captured Taliban combatants lacked any rights,
finding that they could not be held indefinitely under the Geneva Convention and
had due process rights to contest the factual basis for their detention. Then in
Bounediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008), the Supreme Court again held
that enemy combatants could seek habeas corpus review. Congress, however,
twice amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to deny Guantanamo detainees habeas review.
See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680
(2005)
188 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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Nov., Constitutional Issues by President Yoo F E N
01 Appropriations Bill
Nov., Suspend Certain President Yoo, F E N 1 8 9
01 Provisions of the ABM Delahunty
Treaty
Nov., Legality of the Use of President Philbin F E O190
01 Military Commissions to
Try Terrorists
Nov., Persons Captured by US President Yoo, F E O
01 Armed Forces in Delahunty
Afghanistan
Oct., Force to Combat President Yoo, D E OPl92
01 Terrorist Within the Delahunty
o .United States
Sept., Force Against Terrorists President Yoo F E N 19 3
01 and Nations Supporting
Tem
Aug., Recess Appointment to President Koffsky D E OPl94
01 the National Labor
Relations Board
Aug., Designation of Acting President Bradshaw D E N
01 Associate Attorney
General
July, Constitutionality of the President Bradshaw, F E N 1 9 5
01 Rohrabacher Delahunty
Amendment
July, Remove Chairman of President Yoo D E N
01 Prod. Safety Comm'n
June, 18 U.S.C. § 207 and President Koffsky D E N
01 Former Government
SOfficial
Mar., Remove the Staff President Koffsky D E S196
01 Director of the Civil
Rights Comm'n
189 Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding the
treaty termination issue to be a nonjusticiable political question).
190 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 533 (2006).
191 IcL; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
192 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., for the Files 1 (Oct. 6, 2008) (cautioning individuals not to rely on the OLC's
memorandum). Two Supreme Court cases challenge the limits of its use
domestically. See also supra note 190.
193 Sadowski v. Bush, 293 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding the
question to be nonjusticiable).
194 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 698 (2010) (noting that
the NLRB followed normal appointment procedure).
195 The Rohrabacher Amendment seemed to have passed the House as part of
an appropriations bill, H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. (2003), but it ultimately failed.
196 President George W. Bush attempted to replace Victoria Wilson with Peter
Kirsanow, but USCCR Commissioner Mary Frances Berry refused Kirsanow a
seat. See United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 350-53 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Kirsanow sued, claiming Wilson's tenure had expired and that he had been validly
appointed. Wilson won in federal district court but ultimately lost on appeal in
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Sept., Amending Foreign Assoc. Dep. Yoo F E OP17
01 Intelligence Surveillance AG
Dec., Authorization for AG Moss F E N
00 Continuing Hostilities in
Kosovo
Dec., President's Access to President Moss D E N
00 Grand Jury Material and
Pardons
Oct., Coreligionists Exemption President Moss D E sal98
00 in Title VII
Oct., President's Amenability AG Moss D E N
00 to Indictment and
Prosecution
Aug., Former President AG Moss D L N
00 Indictment for Crime
Impeached by House
Oct., Appointment of a President Koffsky D E Se199
99 Senate-Confirmed
Nominee
Sept., Executive Privilege With President Reno D E 0a200
99 Respect To Clemency
Decision
May, Military Operations in AG Moss F E Sc201
99 Kosovo
July, N.J. Transit Corp. President Nolan D L N
98 Member Appointment to
mtrak Bd.
2002, and the court ordered the seating of Kirsanow following this lengthy legal
battle. See id. at 361-62.
197 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., for the Files 6 (Jan. 15, 2009) ("A number of classified OLC opinions issued
in 2001-2002 relied upon a doubtful interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA"). As the Department has previously acknowledged, these
opinions reasoned that unless Congress had made clear in FISA that it sought to
restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless surveillance activities in the
national security area, FISA must be construed to avoid such a reading, and these
opinions asserted that Congress had not included such a clear statement in FISA.
All but one of these opinions have been withdrawn or superseded by later
opinions of this Office." (citations omitted)).
198 See Stuart J. Lark, Religious Expression, Government Funds, and the First
Amendment, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 317, 332 (2003).
199 Dysart v. United States, 369 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
200 Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. H.R v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 104 (D.D.C.
2008) ("[The Court is not at all persuaded by the Reno and Bradbury opinions.
Unlike the Olson and Cooper OLC opinions, which are exhaustive efforts of
sophisticated legal reasoning, bolstered by extensive citation to judicial authority,
the Reno and Bradbury OLC opinions are for the most part conclusory and
recursive. Neither cites to a single judicial opinion recognizing the asserted
absolute immunity.").
201 Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 203 F.3d
19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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June, Vice Chair of Fed. President Peterson D E N
98 Reserve Bd. to Serve
Concurrently
Apr., Require Background President Nolan D L N
98 Checks of Non-career
SES Candidates
Feb., Reimbursement of President Johnsen D E N
98 Expenses Under 5
U.S.C. § 5503(a)
Dec., Retired Judge to the Dep. Assist. Nolan D E N
97 Court of Federal Claims AG
Sept., Funds for Payment of Assis. AG Moss D E N
97 Natural Resource
Damages
Aug., Removal of Holdover President Shiffrin D E N
97 Officials on Fed.
Housing and R.R. Bds.
Aug., 3 U.S.C. § 112 to Dep. Assist. Shiffrin D E N
97 Detailees Supporting the AG
President
Nov., Cong.-Exec. Agreement President Schroeder F E N
96 Modifying Treaty and NSC
obligation.
Sept., Exec. Privilege for President Reno D E Op202
96 Memorandum to the
President
Sept., Exec. Privilege to President Schroeder D E Oc203
96 Assertions of Privilege
Sept., Immunity for Counsel President Schroeder D E Oc204
96 from Compelled
Testimony
July, Sitting Member of President Schroeder D E N
96 Congress to be
Ambassador to Vietnam
202 Political pressure forced him to give the documents up. See Todd David
Peterson, Contempt of Congress v. Executive Privilege, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77,
143-44 (2011) ("President Clinton lost highly publicized battles in the courts to
establish a temporary immunity to civil suit, a 'protective function privilege' for
secret service agents, and an attorney/client privilege with respect to advice given
to the President by White House lawyers. In addition, President Clinton lost some
notable executive privilege battles with Congress." (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 692 (1997); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per
curiam); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 38 (D.D.C. 1998)).
Additionally, Janet Reno was cited for contempt of Congress. See Todd David
Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investigation, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2002).
203 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (denying Deputy Counsel
to the President, Bruce Lindsey, the right to assert the attorney-client privilege in
connection with advice given to the President), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.,
In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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July, Statute Governing President Schroeder D E Sa205
96 Appointment of U.S.
Trade Representative
June, Presidential Certification AG Dellinger F E N
96 & Mexican Debt
Disclosure Act
June, Legislative Provision President Dellinger F E N
96 Regarding ABM Treaty
May, Placing of U.S. Armed President Dellinger F E 0a206
96 Forces Under U.N. and NSC
Control
May, Exec. Privilege Regarding President Reno D E Op207
96 Counsel's Office
Documents
Feb., Conditions on the AG Shiffrin F E Op208
96 Certification of Drug
.Transit
Feb., Authority of the President Dellinger F E N
96 President to Restrict and NSC
Munitions
Dec., 28 U.S.C. § 458 to President Dellinger D E O,209
95 Presidential
Appointments of Fed.
udges
Nov., Proposed Deployment of President Dellinger F E N2 10
95 U.S. Armed Forces into
Bosnia
205 Hanah Metchis Volokh, Note, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory
Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 753 (2008) ("It is
uncontroversial that the President must have considerable discretion to choose a
person he thinks will perform the duties of an office well.").
206 Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral
Context: A Constitutional Analysis of Congress's Power to Restrict the President's
Authority to Place United States Armed Forces under Foreign Commanders in
United Nations Peace Operations, 162 MIL. L. REv. 50, 68 passim (1999) (arguing
that Congress does have such authority); Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders
Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 291, 320-21 (2006).
207 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
208 H.R REP. No. 105-10, at 1(1997).
209 Congress did not buy the argument, opting to amend the statute to make it
applicable to Article III judges. For a summary, see Stras & W. Scott, supra note
63, at 469.
210 "In late 1995, the issue of war powers and Bosnia was raised again as
President Clinton sent more than 20,000 American combat troops to Bosnia as
part of a NATO-led peacekeeping force. In December 1995, Congress considered
and voted on a number of bills and resolutions, but the House and Senate could
not come to consensus on any single measure. Subsequently, President Clinton
in December 1996 agreed to provide up to 8,500 ground troops to participate in a
NATO-led follow-on force in Bosnia termed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). On
March 18, 1998, the House defeated by a vote of 193-225, H. Con. Res. 227,
[150th Cong. (1998)] a resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c)
of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." KRISTIN E. BOON & DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE,
JR., TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURTY DOCUMENTS 148 (2014).
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Nov., Presidential Discretion & President Dellinger D E Sa211
95 Chemical & Bio. and NSC
Weapons
Sept., Appropriations Lapse & President Dellinger D E N
95 White House Office
Employees
May, Bill to Relocate United President Dellinger F E N 2 12
95 States Embassy from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem
May, 18 U.S.C. § 603 & Exec. President Johnsen D E N
95 Employees'
Contributions
Mar., Authority to Issue AG Dellinger D E Oc213
95 Executive Order on Gov't
Procurement
Nov., Declining to Execute President Dellinger D E 0a214
94 Unconstitutional
Statutes
Sept., Deployment of United Four US Dellinger F E N2 1 5
94 States Armed Forces Senators
into Haiti
Sept., Status of NSC as an President Dellinger D E Sc216
93 "Agency" under FOIA
211 Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLuM. L. REv. 331, 382
n.265 (2008).
212 The Bill was tabled until 2002, when President Bush signed it, but refused
to enforce the provision. George W. Bush, Press Release, Statement by the
President (Sept. 30, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/09/20020930-9.html [https://perma.cc/75T9-K5MS].
213 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1336-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that the order conflicted with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 151 et seq.).
214 Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding, 17
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, passim (2014). Justice Scalia, however, used broad
language when describing presidential authority to refuse to execute
unconstitutional statutes. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2702
(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215 "U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 19, 1994. On September 21,
President Clinton reported 'consistent with the War Powers Resolution' the
deployment of 1,500 troops, to be increased by several thousand .... On October
3, 1994, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J. Res. 416 authorizing
the forces in Haiti until March 1, 1995, and providing procedures for a joint
resolution to withdraw the forces. On October 6, the House adopted an amended
text introduced by Representative Ron Dellums. As passed, H.J. Res. 416 stated
the sense of the Congress that the President should have sought congressional
approval before deploying U.S. forces to Haiti, supported a prompt and orderly
withdrawal as soon as possible, and required a monthly report on Haiti as well as
other reports. This same language was also adopted by the Senate on October 6
as S.J. Res. 229, and on October 7 the House passed S.J. Res. 229. President
Clinton signed it on October 25, 1994 (P.L. 103-423)." BOON & DOUGLAS, supra
note 210, at 155.
216 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 559 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
Dec., Authority to Use United President Flanigan F E Sp217
92 States Military Forces in
Somalia
Jan., Issues Raised by President Flanigan D E 0a218
92 Provisions Directing
Issuance of Passports
Jan., Recess Appointments President Flanigan D E 0a219
92 During an Intrasession
Recess
Dec., Recess Appointments to President Flanigan D E Oa220
91 the Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd.
Dec., ppointment to the President McGinnis D E N
90 Comm'n on Nat'1 &
Community Serv.
Oct., White House Commc'ns President Luttig D E N
90 Agency Expenses
Incurred
Apr., Transportation for President Barr D E N
90 Spouses of Cabinet
Members
Mar., Extend Deadline for President McGinnis D L N
90 Emergency Bd. Report
Feb., Issues Raised by Foreign President Barr F E Sa221
90 Relations Authorization
Bill
Jan., Encourage President Barr F E N
90 Contributions to a
Nicaraguan Opposition
Party
Dec., Congressional Access to President Luttig D E N
89 Presidential
Communications
217 "In Somalia, the participation of U.S. military forces in a U.N. operation to
protect humanitarian assistance, which began in December 1992, became
increasingly controversial as fighting and casualties increased and objectives
appeared to be expanding.. . . On February 4, 1993, the Senate passed S.J .Res.
45 [("Resolution Authorizing the Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia")]
to authorize the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 794. S.J. Res. 45 stated it was intended to constitute the
specific statutory authorization under Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution."
BOON & DOUGLAS, supra note 210, at 156.
218 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
219 See Michael A. Carrier, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the
Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2205-06 (1994). The
Supreme Court, decades later, disagreed with the OLC's analysis, holding that
what mattered was whether the recess requires the consent of the House. See
NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
220 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
221 John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs
and War Powers: A Consequence ofRational Choice in the Separation ofPowers, 56
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 309-15 (1993).
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222 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
223 President George H.W. Bush disregarded the advice, however, and reported
to Congress. See Stephen Engelberg, Bush Agrees to Notify Congress on Covert
Actions, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1989, at A9.
224 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992).
225 Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting Terrorism: Reservists'
Reemployment Rights, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 797, 833 n. 187 (2004).
226 President Reagan, however, signed the resolution. H.R.J. Res. 102, 100th
Cong., Pub. L. No. 100-6, 101 Stat. 92 (1987).
227 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 1998 A.M.C. 1946, 1957 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
228 President Clinton later decided to disregard this 1988 memorandum, and
the Supreme Court sided with the OLC in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 449 (1998).
Aug., Intrasession Recess AG Luttig D E 0a222
89 Appointments
July, Congressional AG Barr F E N2 2 3
89 Notification for Certain
CIA Covert Actions
July, The President's President Barr D E N
89 Authority to Convene the
Senate
June, Authority of FBI To AG Barr F E sc224
89 Override International
Law
June, Vacancy Act & President Barr D E N
89 Designation of an Acting
Special Counsel
Apr., Nat'l Guard to Support Acting Kmiec D E Sa225
89 Drug Interdiction Efforts Assoc. AG
in D.C.
Feb., Joint Resolution AG Kmiec D E N 2 2 6
89 Disapproving Pay Raise
Oct., Proclamation To Extend Department Kmiec D E Sc227
88 the Territorial Sea of State
July, The President's Veto AG Cooper D L Sc228
88 Power
Mar., Statute Limiting President Cooper D E N
88 President's Power to
Supervise CDC
Feb., Legal Constraints on President Cooper F L N
88 Lobbying Efforts and INF
Treaty
May, Constitutionality of President Cooper D E N
87 Proposed Budget Process
Reform Legislation
Feb., Joint Resolution President Cooper D E N2 2 9
87 Disapproving the Pay
Recommendations
229 President Reagan chose not to fight Congress over the joint resolution. See
Statement on Signing the Emergency Food and Shelter Bill, 1 PUB. PAPERS 140
(Feb. 12, 1987) ("I recognize that the Congress has the legal authority to repeal the
pay raise."); see also H.R.J. Res. 102, 100th Cong., 101 Stat. 92 (1987) ("Making
emergency additional funds available . . . for the Emergency Food and Shelter
Program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.").
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APPENDIx 3 - AGENCIES
Notes on the table. The "Date" column is written in "month,
year" format. The "Memo" column includes the memo name,
shortened for the sake of brevity. The "Recipient" column re-
fers to the individual to whom the memo was addressed. The
"Author" column is the name of the individual who composed
the memo. The "Topic" column designates whether a given
memo discusses a matter of domestic concern (designated "D")
or of foreign concern (designated "F"). The "Position" column
designates whether a given memo argued for expansive view of
agency powers (designated "E") or argued for limited agency
powers (designated "L"). The "Result" column expounds on
whether a given memo was rejected in court ("Oc"), opposed in
academia ("Oa"), opposed by a political body such as Congress
("Op"), not opposed ("N"), supported by a political body ("Sp"),
supported in academia ("Sa"), or upheld in court ("S,").
Date Memo Recipient Author Topic Position Result
Aug., Application of OMB Thompson D E N 2 3 0
16 Recommenda-
tions Clause to
Medicare Drug
Apr., DOJ Disclosure Dep. AG Thompson D L N
16 to Inspector
Apr., US-EU Air Dep't of Transp. Thompson F L N
16 Transport (DOT)
reement
Mar., Military Officer Dep't of Homeland Thompson D E N2 3 1
16 Leave Sec. (DHS)
Mar., Part-Time Principal Dep. Boynton D E N
15 Workweek Assis. AG
July, DOJ Inspector Dep. AG Thompson D E Oa232
15 Access Wiretap
Act
230 The President followed the advice of the OLC. See Christina S. Ho,
Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration and the Independent Payment Advisory
Board Lock-in Status Quo Majority Advantage?, 50 TULSA L. REv. 695, 742 (2015)
("The funding warnings were also rendered ineffective in the other instances in
which they were triggered because on those occasions, the President invoked the
Recommendations Clause of the Constitution to declare that Congress could only
suggest, and not require, that he submit legislation.").
231 An individual tried by a military tribunal challenged the validity of the
judgment on the grounds that the judges violated the statute; the Court of
Appeals held the argument to be moot. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-8,
10, Dalmazzi v. United States, 2017 WL 475287 (Feb. 1, 2017) (No. 16-961).
232 Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John-Michael Seibler, All Stick and No Carrot: The
Yates Memorandum and Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 STETSON L. REv. 7, 38
(2016) ("The latter, present approach risks the harmful consequences of eroding
fundamental legal privileges: the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
product doctrine, and the self-incrimination privilege.").
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May, Authority to Defense Nuclear Thompson D L N
15 Disclose Facilities Safety Bd.
Performance of
Employees
Sept., Homeland DHS & President Thompson D E Sc233
14 Security
Prioritize
Removal Aliens
(1)
Sept., Homeland DHS & President Thompson D L Sc234
14 Security
Prioritize
Removal Aliens
(2)
Aug., Authority of Soc. Sec. Admin. Bies D L N
14 Equal (SSA)
Employment
Opportunity
Commission
Aug., Competitive DOT Seitz D E N
13 Bidding under
Federal-Aid
Highway
Program
May, Whether the VP & Millennium Seitz D E N2 3 5
13 Millennium Challenge Corp.
Challenge Corp
should be an
"Agency"
Feb., Availability of SSA Seitz D E N
13 Appropriations
for SSA Grant
Programs
Jan., Whether the Peace Corps Seitz D L N
13 Peace Corps
Director May
Certify
Volunteers
Nov., Residence Executive Office for Seitz D L N
12 Requirement for US Attorneys
Assistant US
Attorneys
233 Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 976 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[Tihe
INA is replete with provisions that confer prosecutorial discretion on the Executive
to establish its own enforcement priorities.").
234 A Texas district court issued a preliminary injunction on the DAPA
program, and the Fifth Circuit along with the Supreme Court affirmed. Texas v.
United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), affd, 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015), as revised (Nov. 25, 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906, affd mem.,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
235 However, a D.C. district court applied FOIA's disclosure requirements to
Millennium Challenge Corporation. See Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp.,
228 F. Supp. 3d 28, 35-38 (D.D.C. 2017).
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Nov., Dept. Labor Dept. of Labor Seitz D E N
12 Authority to
Control
Disclosure of
Employee
Records
Aug., Individuals Off. of Gov't Ethics Seitz D E N2 3 6
12 Required to
Provide
Identifying
Information (1)
Aug., Individuals Off. of Gov't Ethics Seitz D L Sc237
12 Required to
Provide
Identifying
Information (2)
May, Duty to Report Dep't Veterans Seitz D L N2 3 8
12 Suspected Child Affairs (DVA)
Abuse
Apr., Reservists who DVA Seitz D E N
12 Qualify for Leave
Must Exhaust
Available Leave
Mar., Anti-Deficiency Dep't of Commerce Seitz D E N
12 Act Implications (DOC)
of Consent (1)
Mar., ti-Deficiency DOC Seitz D L Sc239
12 ct Implications
of Consent (2)
Mar., Deputation of Alcohol, Tobacco, Seitz D E Sc240
12 Federal Law Firearms (ATF)
Enforcement
Officers
Mar., General Services DVA Seitz D E N
12 Admin may
Proceed with
_ Acquisition
236 Note that the Act was attacked as violating individuals' privacy rights.
Senior Execs. Ass'n v. United States, No. 8:12-CV-02297-AW, 2013 WL 1316333,
at *12 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2013) (rejecting a motion to dismiss).
237 Id. at *8 ("Although the Act requires a login for downloading data contained
in the reports, no such requirement attaches to viewing, searching, and sorting
data contained in them.").
238 The proposed standard was adopted by other agencies. See DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORTING CASES OF ABUSE & NEGLECT, 2012 WL 4715102, at *2
(2012).
239 DMS Imaging, Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 794, 799 (2014)
(accepting the government's argument that a broad indemnification clause would
violate the Anti-Deficiency Act, but finding for the plaintiff on other grounds).
240 Cited favorably in United States v. Jennings, No. 14-cr-20240, 2014 WL
4410098, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2014).
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Mar., State Residence ATP Seitz D L Op241
12 Requirements
for Firearms
Transfer
Mar., Whether a United States Postal Powell D E N
12 Collective Serv. (USPS)
Bargaining
Agreement May
Require
Nov., Postal Office of Personnel Seitz D L N
11 Employees Are Management (OPM)
Entitled To
Receive Service
Credit
Nov., Whether postal USPS Seitz D E N
11 employees are
entitled to
receive service
credit
Oct., Nonimmigrant ATF Seitz D L sc242
11 Aliens &
Firearms
Disabilities
under Gun
Control
Sept., Proposals to use Assist. AG of Seitz D E Sc243
11 Internet to Sell Criminal Division
Lottery Tickets
Violate Wire Act
Sept., Restrictions On Off. of Science & Seitz F E Oc244
11 Activities of the Tech. Pol'y (OSTP)
Office of Science
.& Technology
241 Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) rejected the opinion. 77
Fed. Reg. 33630 (proposed June 7, 2012) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pt. 478).
242 Many cases interpret 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B) the same way the OLC did.
See, e.g., United States v. Mohammed Saleh, No. 3:15-cr-50-DCB-FKB, 2016 WL
7077874, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 5, 2016) ("The Court finds that Defendant's belief
that an alien admitted in the United States under a non-immigrant visa could
possess a firearm is not relevant to the pending charge."); see also United States v.
Pacheco-Alvarez, No. 16-cr-140, 2016 WL 7475652, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 29,
2016) (noting that the statute "forbids illegal immigrants from possessing or
receiving firearms or ammunition shipped in interstate commerce").
243 United States v. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2012),
rev'd on other grounds, 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (-The [Wire] Act applies only to
wagering on sporting events.").
244 For an understanding of how the sections of the appropriations bill affected
OSTP, see Hannah Kohler, Note, The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.-Chinese Relations,
the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International Cooperation in Space, 103
GEO. L.J. 1135, 1153 (2015) ("The GAO, however, was not persuaded. 'It is not
our role nor within our province to opine upon or adjudicate the constitutionality
of duly enacted statutes such as section 1340,' the opinion states, adding that
legislation signed by the President after being passed by Congress 'is entitled to a
heavy presumption in favor of constitutionality.' As a result, the GAO found the
OSTP in violation of Section 1340 and thus the Antideficiency Act, which sets
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Aug., HHS May Dep't of Health & Bies D L N
11 Provide the GAO Human Servs.
Access to (HHS)
Information
June, Foreign Access Review Krass F L Sc245
11 Intelligence Comm.
Surveillance
Act's notification
Feb., Reimbursement EPA Krass D E N
11 or payment
obligation under
Clean Water Act
Dec., Disposition of SSA Koffsky D L N
10 proceeds from
the sale of real
property
Dec., Availability of Acting Dep. AG Bies D L Sc246
10 rights under the
Crime Victims'
Rights Act
Nov., Whether the Dep't of Treasury & Cedarbaum D E N
10 special master is Troubled Asset
a principal
officer
Oct., Emoluments DOC Koffsky F E N
10 clause and the
Gbteborg award
June, Entitlement to OPM Rhee D E N
10 reservist
differential pay,
5 U.S.C. § 5538
June, Emoluments Admin. Conf. of the Barron F E N
10 clause to ACUS United States
May, Tax levies under Internal Revenue Koffsky D E S,
10 26 U.S.C. 6334 Service (IRS)
to Thrift Savings
Plan Accounts
forth conditions and penalties for misuse of congressional appropriations."
(citations omitted)).
245 Gill v. Dep't of Justice, No. 15-824 (RMC), 2016 WL 3982450, at *7 (D.D.C.
July 22, 2016) (assuming that FISA applies to Access Review Conittee
proceedings).
246 Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ("The
Court first addresses the threshold issue whether the CVRA attaches before the
government brings formal charges against the defendant[.] The Court holds that
it does because the statutory language clearly contemplates pre-charge
proceedings.").
247 Blanchette v. SSA, No. 13-12655-RGS, 2014 WL 667514, at *1 (D. Mass.
Feb. 21, 2014) (noting that "thrift savings plans and Social Security benefits are
not [exempt from levy]" (alterations in original) (quoting Overton v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1045 (D.N.M.1999)).
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Apr., Constitutional Treasury Barron D L N
10 Concerns in
Proposed
Orderly
Liquidation
Jan., Census DOC Rhee D E N
10 Confidentiality
and the Patriot
_ Act
Dec., Authority in AG Barron D E N2 4 8
09 Certifying a
State for Capital
Conviction
Review
Dec., Whether Clean EPA Cedarbaum D L N
09 Air Act Permits
the Receipt of
Monetary
Donations
Oct., Payments in Dep't of Housing & Barron D L Sc249
09 Satisfaction of Urban Dev. (HUD)
Pre-existing
Contractual
Obligations
Oct., Constitutionality Treasury Barron D E N 2 50
09 of Mandatory
Registration of
Credit Rating
Sept., Authority of the Fed. Housing Fin. Koffsky D L N
09 Former Auth. (FHFA)
Inspector
General of the
FHFB
Aug., Permissibility of Small Bus. Org. Rhee D E sa251
09 Regulations (SBO)
Implementing
the Historically
248 In 2013, a California District Court issued a preliminary injunction on the
final rule. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. C 13-4517 CW,
2013 WL 6326618, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013). In 2016, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the organization lacked standing to challenge
administrative action. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 816 F.3d
1241, 1254 (9th Cir. 2016).
249 Cf. ACORN v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(issuing a preliminary injunction against section 163). However, the same court
later held that section 163 constituted a bill of attainder, Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for
Reform Now v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 2d 260, 269-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), but
the Second Circuit reversed that determination. See 618 F.3d 125, 136-37 (2d
Cir. 2010).
250 See Julia Zukina, Note, A Step Short of Change: Examining the Recent
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Its Shortcomings in a Global Market, 13 J.
Bus. & SEC. L. 259, 284-85 (2013).
251 Garrison, supra note 35, at 236-37 ("[T]he OLC wields significant inter-
branch power ... to issue binding determinations of the law within the executive
branch and adjudicate executive branch intra-agency legal disputes.").
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June, Withdrawal of AG Barron D L N
09 Office of Legal
Counsel Opinion
June, Constitutionality Dep't of State Barron D E N
09 of § 7054 of
Foreign
Appropriations
Act
May, Validity of AG Barron D E Sp252
09 Statutory
Rollbacks as a
Means of
Complying
Apr., Constitutionality Off. of Legislative Lederman D L N
09 of the Ronald Aff. (OLA)
Reagan
Centennial
Comm'n Act
Apr., Withdrawal of AG Barron F L N
09 Office of Legal
Counsel
Interrogation
Opinions
Dec., Meaning of DHS Elwood D E Sc253
08 "Temporary"
Work under 8
U.S.C. § 1101
Nov., Requests under Fed. Bureau of Koffsky D E O,254
08 the Electronic Investigation (FBI)
Communications
Privacy Act
Sept., Enforceability of Treasury Bradbury D L N
08 Certain
Agreements
Aug., Applicability of DOC Elwood F E N
08 18 U.S.C. § 207
to Public
Relations
Activities
May, Admissibility of OPM Elwood D E N
08 Electronic
Copies of
Personnel
Records
252 Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1023, 1058 n. 192 (2009) (noting that Congress passed the
rollback to permit Senator Hillary Clinton to serve as the Secretary of State, which
she thereafter did).
253 In re Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 2009-PER-00379 (Bd. Alien Lab. Cert. App.
Nov. 21, 2011), *38-41 (applying the regulation).
254 After an individual challenged the constitutionality of the statute, the
government withdrew the request, rendering the issue moot. See John Doe, Inc.
v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 869 (2d Cir. 2008).
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May, Authority of the EPA Engel D E N
08 EPA to Hold
Employees
Liable
Apr., Promotions of Dep't of Defense Bradbury D L N
08 Judge Advocates (Defense)
General under
section 543
Feb., Prosecute White AG Bradbury D L Sc255
08 House Officials
for Contempt of
Congress
Feb., Off. of Gov't Off. of Gov't Ethics Elwood D L N
08 Ethics
Jurisdiction over
the Smithsonian
Institution
Feb., Payment of Back DVA Engel D L N
08 Wages to Alien
Physicians Hired
under the H-lb
Feb., Payment of Back Dep't of Labor Engel D E N
08 Wages to Alien
Physicians Hired
under the H-lb
Jan., Constitutionality 0MB & DHS Bradbury D E N
08 of the Direct
Reporting
Requirement
Nov., Compliance of Central Intelligence Bradbury F E OP256
07 Interrogation Agency (CIA)
Techniques (4) 1 1_1_1
255 However, note that Congress could file a civil action in Federal Court.
Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. H.R. v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 78 (D.D.C. 2008) ("To
recap, the Committee has issued subpoenas to two high-ranking executive
branch officials who have refused to comply, citing executive privilege. The
Committee's attempt to pursue criminal prosecution of its contempt of Congress
citation was thwarted by the Executive. Exercise of Congress's inherent contempt
power through arrest and confinement of a senior executive official would provoke
an unseemly constitutional confrontation that should be avoided. Cf. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 691-92, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (concluding that forcing the
President to disobey a court order to obtain appellate review would create an
unseemly, unnecessary constitutional confrontation between the branches).
Thus, the Committee filed this suit to vindicate both its right to the information
that is the subject of the subpoena and its institutional prerogative to compel
compliance with its subpoenas. A harm to either interest satisfies the injury-in-
fact standing requirement. Clear judicial precedent, along with persuasive
reasoning in OLC opinions, establishes that the Committee has standing to
pursue this action and, moreover, that this type of dispute is justiciable in federal
court. Consequently, the Executive's motion to dismiss for lack of standing will be
denied.").
256 Exec. Order No. 13,491 (2009).
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Nov., Compliance of CIA Bradbury F E Op257
07 Interrogation
Techniques (3)
Oct., Application of 18 CIA Bradbury D L N
07 U.S.C. § 207 to
Former CIA
Officials
Aug., Compliance of CIA Bradbury F E Op258
07 Interrogation
Techniques (2)
July, Compliance of CIA Bradbury F E Op259
07 Interrogation
Techniques (1)
July, Application of CIA Bradbury F E Op260
07 the War Crimes
Act, the
Detainee
Treatment Act
June, Application of Off. of Justice Elwood D E N
07 the Religious Programs
Freedom
Restoration Act
June, Application of FBI Elwood D E N
07 the Emoluments
Clause to a
Member of the
FBI
May, Eligibility of a Defense Marshall D E N
07 Retired Army
Officer to be
Appointed
Apr., Use of EPA Marshall D E Oc261
07 Appropriated
Funds to Provide
Light
Refreshments
Mar., Status of the Secs. & Exchange Bradbury D L N
07 Public Company Comm'n (SEC)
Accounting
,Oversight Board
Mar., Legality of HHS Marshall D E Sc262
07 terative
Organ Donation
Practices
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 JCL
261 Antideficiency Act-Applicability to Statutory Prohibitions on the Use of
Appropriations, B-317450, at 3-4 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 23, 2009).
262 Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
Jan., Days of Service Defense Bradbury D L Sc263
07 by Special
Government
Employees
263 Cf. Lambert v. United States, No. 3:15-CV-147-PLR-HBG, 2016 WL
632461, at *4-5 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2016) (dismissing a case against a former
senior official for an ethical violation).
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